

CORONATION GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS FLEXIBLE [ZAR] FUND

Fund Information as at 31 March 2021

WHAT IS THE FUND'S OBJECTIVE?

The Global Emerging Markets Flexible [ZAR] Fund aims to give investors access to the best opportunities in emerging equity markets. The fund actively seeks out attractively valued shares to maximise long-term growth. Our intent is to outperform the emerging equity benchmark over all periods of five years and longer.

WHAT DOES THE FUND INVEST IN?

The fund invests in the shares of companies which are either based in emerging countries, or earn a significant part of their revenue from emerging economies. It can also invest in cash and bonds, but will remain biased towards shares at all times. The fund is mandated to use derivative instruments for efficient portfolio management purposes.

IMPORTANT PORTFOLIO CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS

Risk Profile



Maximum growth/ minimum income exposures



The fund will only invest in shares we view as being attractively valued and which may offer superior long-term investment growth.

The fund's share selection is the result of rigorous international research conducted by Coronation's investment team.

While we have a disciplined approach to reducing risk, shares can be volatile investments and there is a meaningful risk of capital loss over the short term. Emerging markets are generally viewed as more risky than developed markets. Global currency movements may intensify investment gains or declines.

HOW LONG SHOULD INVESTORS REMAIN INVESTED?

The fund is managed to deliver the best possible returns over the long term; an investment horizon of 10 years or more is therefore ideal. It is not suitable as a single investment for investors who need to preserve their capital over five years or less.

WHO SHOULD CONSIDER INVESTING IN THE FUND?

Investors who are building wealth, and who

- ▶ are comfortable with full exposure to shares in emerging markets;
- ▶ accept that the fund may underperform the market significantly in the short term in pursuit of superior long-term gains;
- ▶ hold other investments and are looking for exposure to emerging markets;
- ▶ do not require an income from their investment.

WHAT COSTS CAN I EXPECT TO PAY?

An annual fee of a minimum of 1.00% and a maximum of 2.40%, depending on the fund's performance, is payable.

If fund performance equals that of the benchmark (after fees and costs), a fee of 1.15% will be charged. We share in 20% of performance above the benchmark, up to a total annual fee of 2.40%. Performance is measured over a rolling 24-month period.

If the fund underperforms the benchmark over any 60-month period, the fee is reduced by 0.15%.

All fees exclude VAT. Fund expenses that are incurred in the fund include administrative, trading, custody and audit charges. All performance information is disclosed after deducting all fees and other portfolio costs.

We do not charge any fees to access or withdraw from the fund.

More detail is available on www.coronation.com.

WHO ARE THE FUND MANAGERS?

GAVIN JOUBERT
BBusSc, CA (SA), CFA

SUHAIL SULEMAN
BBusSc, CFA

IAKOVOS MEKIOS
Ptychion (BSc), MIA, IMC, CFA

LISA HAAKMAN
CA (SA), CFA

PAUL NEETHLING
CA (SA), CFA

GENERAL FUND INFORMATION

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------|
| Launch Date | 28 December 2007 |
| Fund Class | A |
| Benchmark | MSCI Emerging Markets Index |
| Fund Category | Global – Multi-asset – Flexible |
| Regulation 28 | Does not comply |
| Investment Minimum | R5 000 or R500/m debit order |
| Bloomberg Code | CORGLOB |
| ISIN Code | ZAE000109211 |
| JSE Code | CGEM |

CORONATION GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS FLEXIBLE [ZAR] FUND


CLASS A as at 31 March 2021

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| Fund category | Global - Multi Asset - Flexible |
| Launch date | 28 December 2007 |
| Fund size | R 6.51 billion |
| NAV | 392.69 cents |
| Benchmark/Performance | MSCI Emerging Markets Index |
| Fee Hurdle | |
| Portfolio manager/s | Gavin Joubert, Suhail Suleman, Lisa Haakman, Iakovos Mekios and Paul Neethling |

| | | |
|--|--------|--------|
| Total Expense Ratio | 1 Year | 3 Year |
| Fee for performance in line with benchmark | 1.83% | 1.62% |
| Adjusted for out/(under)-performance | 1.15% | 1.15% |
| Fund expenses | 0.37% | 0.16% |
| VAT | 0.09% | 0.11% |
| Transaction costs (inc. VAT) | 0.23% | 0.19% |
| Total Investment Charge | 0.19% | 0.17% |
| | 2.02% | 1.79% |

PERFORMANCE AND RISK STATISTICS

GROWTH OF A R100,000 INVESTMENT (AFTER FEES)



PERFORMANCE FOR VARIOUS PERIODS (AFTER FEES)

| | Fund | Benchmark | Active Return |
|------------------------------|--------|-----------|---------------|
| Since Launch (unannualised) | 305.8% | 221.9% | 83.9% |
| Since Launch (annualised) | 11.2% | 9.2% | 1.9% |
| Latest 10 years (annualised) | 13.3% | 12.3% | 1.0% |
| Latest 5 years (annualised) | 13.4% | 12.3% | 1.1% |
| Latest 3 years (annualised) | 17.0% | 14.7% | 2.3% |
| Latest 1 year | 33.7% | 31.1% | 2.6% |
| Year to date | 2.8% | 2.9% | (0.1)% |

RISK STATISTICS SINCE LAUNCH

| | Fund | Benchmark |
|-----------------------|---------|---------------------|
| Annualised Return | 11.2% | 9.2% |
| Annualised Deviation | 16.7% | 15.3% |
| Sharpe Ratio | 0.27 | 0.17 |
| Maximum Gain | 25.5% | 36.4% |
| Maximum Drawdown | (38.6)% | (44.2)% |
| Positive Months | 57.9% | 57.9% |
| | Fund | Date Range |
| Highest annual return | 49.7% | Mar 2009 - Feb 2010 |
| Lowest annual return | (37.5)% | Mar 2008 - Feb 2009 |

MONTHLY PERFORMANCE RETURNS (AFTER FEES)

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | YTD |
|-----------|------|--------|--------|-------|--------|------|------|------|--------|--------|------|------|-------|
| Fund 2021 | 4.4% | 0.6% | (2.2)% | | | | | | | | | | 2.8% |
| Fund 2020 | 4.2% | (4.7)% | (1.5)% | 12.2% | (2.9)% | 7.0% | 5.5% | 3.7% | (3.6)% | (1.3)% | 5.4% | 1.8% | 27.3% |
| Fund 2019 | 3.8% | 9.1% | 7.3% | 1.5% | (4.6)% | 4.8% | 0.6% | 2.7% | (1.3)% | 2.1% | 0.3% | 1.9% | 31.3% |

PORTFOLIO DETAIL

EFFECTIVE ASSET ALLOCATION EXPOSURE

| Country | 31 Mar 2021 |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| Equities | 97.29% |
| China | 32.47% |
| South Africa | 9.47% |
| Russian Federation | 8.88% |
| South Korea | 7.02% |
| Brazil | 6.81% |
| India | 5.99% |
| Taiwan Province Of China | 3.88% |
| France | 3.50% |
| United Kingdom | 2.92% |
| Mexico | 2.87% |
| Other | 13.48% |
| Cash | 2.50% |
| USD | 1.49% |
| ZAR | 0.81% |
| Other | 0.56% |
| HKD | (0.08)% |
| EUR | (0.29)% |
| Real Estate | 0.12% |
| Brazil | 0.12% |
| Commodities | 0.09% |
| Ireland | 0.09% |

TOP 10 HOLDINGS

| As at 31 Mar 2021 | % of Fund |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|
| Naspers Ltd (South Africa) | 8.3% |
| Jd.com Inc ADR (China) | 5.9% |
| Alibaba Group Holding (China) | 5.0% |
| Samsung (South Korea) | 3.1% |
| Netease.com Inc (China) | 2.9% |
| Housing Dev Finance Corp (India) | 2.8% |
| Naver Corp (South Korea) | 2.8% |
| New Oriental Education & Tech (China) | 2.5% |
| Philip Morris Int Inc (United States) | 2.3% |
| Ping An Insurance Group Co (China) | 2.3% |

INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS

| Declaration | Payment | Amount | Dividend | Interest |
|-------------|-------------|--------|----------|----------|
| 30 Sep 2019 | 01 Oct 2019 | 1.65 | 1.63 | 0.01 |
| 29 Mar 2019 | 01 Apr 2019 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.01 |

CORONATION GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS FLEXIBLE [ZAR] FUND

Quarterly Portfolio Manager Commentary

Please note that the commentary is for the retail class of the fund.

The Coronation Global Emerging Markets Flexible Fund returned 2.8% during the first quarter of 2021, 0.1% behind the 2.9% return of the benchmark MSCI Emerging Markets (Net) Total Return Index. Over the last 12 months, the Fund has returned 33.7%, 2.7% ahead of the benchmark's return. The high absolute returns from both the Fund and benchmark should be seen in the context of the market selloff during March 2020, the early stages of the Covid-19 panic, and from which the markets subsequently recovered very strongly. This is in spite of the significant strengthening of the rand over the last year, which would have hindered performance of both the fund and benchmark, which are both more than 90% non-ZAR in nature. Over two years, the Fund has outperformed the benchmark by 3.6% p.a., over five years by 1.1% p.a. and over 10 years by 1.0% p.a. Finally, since inception, the Fund has returned 11.2% p.a., which is 1.9% p.a. ahead of its benchmark. We are pleased by this level of outperformance and continue to believe that focusing on higher quality undervalued assets, and being disciplined in buying them at an attractive margin of safety (and selling them when they are expensive), will generate outperformance for our investors over meaningful long-term periods of time.

The biggest contributor to outperformance (alpha) in the quarter was the Naspers and Prosus combined position, which returned an effective 15% in the period. Naspers and Prosus are owned in preference to owning Tencent outright due to the discount at which Naspers trades to the look-through value of its stake in Prosus and the onward discount at which Prosus trades to the value of its stake in Tencent. At the beginning of the year, these discounts effectively allowed a Naspers shareholder to own Tencent at an approximate 40% discount to the value of its Tencent stake alone, with all other assets valued at zero. During the quarter, the discount narrowed a few percentage points (Naspers outperformed Tencent by about 8%) and this, coupled with the overweight position, contributed close to 0.9% of alpha alone. Not holding Tencent directly cost 0.3% of alpha, resulting in a net alpha contribution of 0.6% overall. Management of Naspers and Prosus have undertaken to unlock this discount over time and are heavily incentivised to do so.

The next largest contributor was a member of the Tencent family – Tencent Music Entertainment (TME, 57% held by Tencent). TME rose by 65% (in US Dollars, as are all share price moves unless specified otherwise) from the start of the quarter to 23 March, but then declined precipitously over the next three days and did little thereafter so as to end only 7% higher. The proximate cause for this decline was the massive unwind in many stocks caught up in the much-publicised Archegos fiasco. TME was a 2.1% position at the start of the quarter and we sold regularly as the share price increased until at one point in March the position size was down to 1.0% of the Fund as a result of the sales. In our view, there was no significant change in the underlying value of the business after the share price sold off, so we bought back sufficient stock during the tumult to leave the position size at quarter-end almost unchanged at 2.0% of Fund. The realized return from TME for the Fund was well ahead of the price appreciation and the overall alpha contribution amounted to 0.6%.

The third largest contributor was the Brazilian retailer CBD, a positive example of value unlock by management. At the turn of the year, the Fund held a 1.8% position in CBD, whose ADRs were priced at \$14.30. This was down by over a third from the share price at the start of 2020. Although part of this was driven by the decline in the currency, this was one of the few food retailers under our coverage to see such marked share price weakness, particularly when one considers that food retailers faced amongst the least business disruption worldwide as "essential service providers", and much of the spending that would otherwise have taken place in restaurants and bars migrated toward them. CBD's management team, with whom we have engaged extensively over the years, announced and carried out a plan to separate the business into its two constituent parts in order to realise better value for the underlying parts of the business. This separation was announced last year, but only came to fruition in early March after getting all the requisite regulatory and shareholder approvals. At this point, CBD spun out its lucrative Cash and Carry business, Assai, to shareholders, with the core supermarket and hypermarket business remaining in the original CBD. The spinoff was possible since the businesses had very separate management and supply chain structures and their underlying drivers differ significantly. The original CBD remains have rallied significantly off the post spinoff ADR price and this, coupled with appreciation in the Assai ADR price, has seen the combined value increase by 31.5% to \$18.83. The combined alpha from CBD/Assai during the quarter came to 0.6%. We have retained both constituent stocks in the Fund, although the CBD position was trimmed in response to the share price moves.


The last two significant contributors to alpha were Naver and China Literature. Naver returned close to 25% in the quarter, while China Literature returned 27%. They each contributed around 0.35% to alpha. In the case of Naver, our conviction levels have increased significantly due to market developments. Naver is the number two player in the ecommerce space in Korea. The number one player, Coupang, came to market in an IPO that was heavily oversubscribed and beyond valuation metrics that made sense to own in the Fund after it jumped 40% on its first day of trading. The additional information gleaned during the IPO process on the market opportunity, coupled with better disclosure by Naver on the size of the ecommerce opportunity, resulted in us increasing both our estimate of fair value and the overall conviction in the investment case. As an example, Naver disclosed that their ecommerce GMV already amounted to \$25 billion in 2020 and they have targeted a 30% market share by 2025, which would comfortably establish them as a strong number two player, if achieved, in what will likely be a 2-3 player market. South Korea has the highest ecommerce penetration in the world (30-32% estimate), a function of its high degree of urbanisation and technologically savvy population. As a result, its ecommerce market is already the fifth largest, despite the country being the twelfth largest economy overall.

On the negative side, among the biggest detractors was Magnit, down 12% for a -0.3% contribution to alpha. This was in spite of decent 2020 results for both them and X5, their main competitor and larger player in Russian food retail (also held in the Fund). As expected, traffic declined significantly in stores during the year, but 15% like-for-like increase in average basket size allowed like-for-like sales to increase by 8% in their mature stores, far in excess of inflation. Great cash generation allowed Magnit to reduce its debt burden in absolute terms and the improvement in profitability saw leverage decline to 1.1x Net Debt to EBITDA. Magnit trades

on 13.5x forward earnings and offers an 8.5% dividend yield, which in both absolute and relative terms is very attractive.

Another material detractor (-0.3%) was New Oriental Education (EDU), which declined 24% in the quarter. In an almost carbon copy reaction to previous regulatory intervention in 2018 (which allowed us to buy New Oriental after a 40% share price decline), various levels of Chinese government (both national and regional level) enacted rules aimed at curbing abuse by smaller tuition providers. The trigger for the intervention was the news that many small providers, having taken tuition payments upfront, then went out of business, leaving the parents with no recourse to the funds paid in advance. The regulatory authorities now require money to be suitably deposited at a bank, with parents ranking as secured creditors. Additional changes include restrictions on sales and marketing as well as tighter approval processes for awarding business licenses. These changes should all benefit the established credible players such as New Oriental, as they raise barriers to entry and make it more difficult for smaller subscale players to use temporary cash flows to stay afloat. We added to New Oriental on the price decline and also bought TAL education into the Fund. TAL is another leading tuition provider that we owned many years ago but sold out as it reached fair value. We have long wanted to own it again as the business has executed incredibly well in the intervening years, but it had always been too expensive. The share price declined from \$90 to \$50 between mid-February and late March, which provided a good buying opportunity. TAL differs from EDU in that it is focused on small class offerings or one on one tuition and predominantly covering maths and science. This compares to EDU, which offers larger classes and a wider variety of subjects, particularly English. Additionally, TAL have expanded more aggressively into the online space than peers and have achieved double-digit market share. The promotional spend to get there has affected their profitability, a situation we expect to reverse over time. The different operating models of the two businesses allows them both to take market share without necessarily coming into direct competition with each other.

Other than TAL, there were several small new buys. One of these, Autohome (0.7% position), is the leading online destination for automotive information in China. The site is a "one stop shop" that helps users to research, buy and sell cars. Users can also access finance and insurance through the site, thereby covering the full value chain. Purchasing an automobile is an infrequent event for most users and it typically requires significant groundwork in order to navigate through the multitude of options available. A specialist auto site with independent reviews offers greater value to consumers than general sites and/or those with predominantly sponsored content. Like most internet portals, the feedback loop between a large amount of users or traffic creates an ecosystem of greater value than what the competition offers and raises barriers to entry for competing sites. With 62 million monthly active users, Autohome is larger than the next three largest apps combined. The site makes money through advertising, generating leads for dealers, providing demand data (colours, models, etc.) to manufacturers and matching buyers and sellers of used cars. Additional commission is also earned by facilitating financing and insurance for vehicle purchases. The tailwinds for growth for Autohome are very strong. In addition to rising income levels, there are twin benefits of low vehicle penetration and low online advertising penetration in automobiles relative to other sectors. The used car market is also relatively new (the existing vehicle fleet in the country is not particularly old), and this will change over time. Autohome is capital-light and generates returns on invested capital (ROIC) above 35%. Due to the very high cash conversion (>100% of earnings converted to cash), Autohome has almost a third of its market cap in cash and trades at 16x forward earnings excluding this cash. The company also benefits from having Ping An as an anchor shareholder (45%), as Ping An brings strong strategic skills and significant network benefits from their large customer base.



Other new buys included AngloGold Ashanti (0.6% position), XP Inc. (0.7%), a highly innovative Brazilian wealth manager and investment bank, and Xiabuxiabu Catering (0.7%), who operate Hot Pot restaurants across China.

Finally, due to continued share price strength and reaching of our estimate of fair value, we sold the small remaining positions in Hong Kong Exchanges and Midea Group (Chinese appliance maker). Each was a 0.2% position at the beginning of the year.

Portfolio managers

Gavin Joubert, Lisa Haakman, Iakovos Mekios & Paul Neethling
as at 31 March 2021

IMPORTANT INFORMATION THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BEFORE INVESTING IN THE CORONATION GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS FLEXIBLE [ZAR] FUND

The Global Emerging Markets Flexible [ZAR] Fund should be considered a long-term investment. The value of units may go down as well as up, and therefore Coronation does not make any guarantees with respect to the protection of capital or returns. Past performance is not necessarily an indication of future performance. The fund is mandated to invest up to 100% of its portfolio into foreign securities and may as a result be exposed to macroeconomic, settlement, political, tax, reporting or illiquidity risk factors that may be different to similar investments in the South African markets. Fluctuations or movements in exchange rates may cause the value of underlying investments to go up or down. Asset allocation and top 10 holdings are reflected on a look-through basis. Coronation Management Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd is a Collective Investment Schemes Manager approved by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority in terms of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act. Portfolio managed by Coronation Asset Management (Pty) (FSP 548) Ltd, an authorised financial services provider. The Management Company reserves the right to close the fund to new investors if we deem it necessary to limit further inflows in order for it to be managed in accordance with its mandate. Unit trusts are allowed to engage in scrip lending and borrowing. Standard Chartered has been appointed as trustees for the fund (www.sc.com/za; 011-2176600). Coronation is a full member of the Association for Savings & Investment SA (ASISA).

HOW ARE UNITS PRICED AND AT WHICH PRICE WILL MY TRANSACTION BE EXECUTED?

Unit trusts are traded at ruling prices set on every trading day. Fund valuations take place at approximately 15h00 each business day, except at month end when the valuation is performed at approximately 17h00 (JSE market close) and forward pricing is used. Instructions must reach the Management Company before 14h00 (12h00 for the Money Market Fund) to ensure same day value. The payment of withdrawals may be delayed in extraordinary circumstances, when the manager with the consent of the fund trustees deem this to be in the interest of all fund investors. These circumstances may include periods when significant underlying markets suspend trading which will prevent accurate valuation of the instruments held in the fund. When the suspension of trading relates to only certain assets held by the fund, these assets may be side-pocketed. This process allows normal liquidity on the assets that can be valued, but will delay liquidity on the affected portion of the fund. If the fund is faced with excessive withdrawals, the affected withdrawals may be ring-fenced, which is the separation and delayed sale of the assets reflecting the interest of the liquidity seeking investors. It ensures that the sale of a large number of units will not force Coronation to sell the underlying investments in a manner that may have a negative impact on remaining investors of the fund.

HOW WAS THE PERFORMANCE INFORMATION INCLUDED IN THIS FACT SHEET CALCULATED?

Performance is calculated by Coronation as at the last day of the month for a lump sum investment using Class A NAV prices with income distributions reinvested. All underlying price and distribution data is sourced from Morningstar. Performance figures are quoted after the deduction of all costs (including manager fees and trading costs) incurred within the fund. Note that individual investor performance may differ as a result of the actual investment date, the date of reinvestment of distributions and dividend withholding tax, where applicable. Annualised performance figures represent the geometric average return earned by the fund over the given time period. Unannualised performance represents the total return earned by the fund over the given time period, expressed as a percentage.

WHAT IS THE TOTAL EXPENSE RATIO (TER) AND TRANSACTION COSTS (TC)?

TER is calculated as a percentage of the average net asset value of the portfolio incurred as charges, levies and fees in the management of the portfolio. The TER charged by any underlying fund held as part of a fund's portfolio is included in the fund expenses portion of the TER, but trading and implementation costs incurred in managing the fund are excluded. A higher TER does not necessarily imply a poor return, nor does a low TER imply a good return. The current TER may not necessarily be an accurate indication of future TER's. The 1 year TER is for the 12 months to end of September 2020 (updated annually). The 3 year TER is for a rolling 36-month period to the last quarter end (December, March, June and September).

Transaction costs are a necessary cost in managing a fund and impacts the fund's return. They should not be considered in isolation as returns may be impacted by many other factors over time including market returns, the type of fund, the investment decisions of the investment manager and the TER.

The Total Investment Charge is the sum of the Total Expense Ratio (TER) and transaction costs.

ADVICE AND PLATFORM COSTS

Coronation does not provide financial advice. If you appoint an adviser, advice fees are contracted directly between you and the adviser. For more information please contact the relevant platform (Linked Investment Service Provider or Life Assurance Provider).

WHERE CAN I FIND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION?

Additional information such as daily fund prices, brochures, application forms and a schedule of fund fees and charges is available on our website, www.coronation.com

IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING TERMS OF USE

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