corospondent

The Coronation Fund Managers Institutional Quarterly

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NOTES FROM MY INBOX

AN AGE OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

By Kirshni Totaram

Kirshni is global head of institutional business. She is a qualified actuary and a former manager of the Coronation Property Equity portfolio. Kirshni joined Coronation in 2000.

It has been a period of profound political and economic change around the world. The shocking developments of 2016 continue to shift the ground under our feet. The new US president keeps on upsetting geopolitics, while the UK premier, Theresa May, recently triggered the famed Article 50, following the surprise outcome of the Brexit vote in June last year. So for the Brits it is, "See EU later!" – an apt headline from *The Sun* newspaper.

Throughout the world, the vox populi is growing louder and louder, with people everywhere expressing a universal discontent with the established world order. People are simply fed up with being left behind, which they blame on globalisation. Understandably, they want to see economic prosperity that does not only benefit a few. However, their discontent is channelled towards solutions (protectionism, anti-immigration, nationalism) that will not necessarily serve their own interests, or those of the broader society, in the long run. This will have a concerning impact on the direction that economic vectors are pointing.

Back home, the last few weeks have felt surreal (and not in a good way). South Africans too are currently living through extraordinary times of political and economic crisis. The midnight hour cabinet reshuffle at the end of March has triggered a shockwave of ratings downgrades, the effects of which will be felt for years to come. We lost our investment grade rating, which was secured through great discipline 17 years ago. This achievement by the first democratically elected government has had a tremendously positive impact on the domestic economy.

Political events have most likely delivered a 'knockout blow' to the nascent economic recovery we had been optimistically hoping for. The situation has the most serious consequences for the poor who have no defence against the economic fallout unleashed by infighting in the ruling party. A culture of corruption and patronage is truly ripping SA apart.

Against a turbulent background, this bumper edition of *Corospondent* contains our analysis of the many (concerning) events unfolding around the world. In the lead article



(page 5), Neville Chester dissects the impact of the recent events on SA and the aftershocks that await investors and the economy.

It is in turbulent times like these that we are continually reminded that risk is an integral and unavoidable part of life. And the first rule of investing is to ensure that you allocate capital to those opportunities that will appropriately reward you for the risk you have taken. Most of us like to just talk return: it's simple and, let's face it, easier to understand. In his article (page 11), our CIO, Karl Leinberger, takes a closer look at the vital role that risk management plays in investments. I found it a very timely read for this new era of uncertainty.

The rise of populism is a significant force around the world. Our economist, Marie Antelme, examines the causes and economic ramifications of this strong political doctrine of our time (on page 8).

Times of stress and great emotion in markets often present great investment opportunities, and as always we continue to invest in long-term holdings that we believe will unlock value for our clients. In this issue, you will find our views on opportunities in frontier markets (page 20), in a Russian



banking behemoth (page 16) and in the local mobile telecommunication group MTN (page 18).

History has taught us, time and time again, that our ability to forecast the immediate future is limited. Our focus remains on building diversified portfolios of undervalued assets that can withstand the shocks that seem to keep coming our way. We have been steadfast in our focus and commitment to deliver investment excellence for our clients.

Usually, at this point, I would urge you to enjoy the read. In truth, I cannot guarantee you a pleasant reading experience this time around. But I do hope that you find our insights useful, providing you with some security and clarity in these pressured times.



MARKET MOVEMENTS

	1st quarter 2017	2016
All Share Index R	3.8%	2.6%
All Share Index \$	5.9%	15.9%
All Bond R	2.5%	15.5%
All Bond \$	4.6%	30.4%
Cash R	1.9%	7.4%
Resources Index R	2.7%	34.2%
Financial Index R	(1.1%)	5.4%
Industrial Index R	6.6%	(6.6%)
MSCI World \$	6.4%	8.2%
MSCI ACWI \$	6.9%	7.9%
MSCI EM \$	11.5%	11.2%
S&P 500	6.1%	12.0%
Nasdaq \$	12.1%	7.3%
MSCI Pacific \$	7.0%	4.5%
Dow Jones EURO Stoxx 50 \$	8.3%	0.7%





SA IN CRISIS

RADICAL ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION WILL NOT END WELL FOR THE MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICANS

by Neville Chester

Neville is a senior member of the investment team with 20 years' investment experience. He joined Coronation in 2000 and manages Coronation's Aggressive Equity Strategy.



During our recent institutional roadshow, I was, for the first time in many years, fairly upbeat about our country's prospects for the year ahead. Commodity prices were up, heavy rains had resoundingly broken the drought, and both consumer and manufacturer confidence indices were rising. All of these boded well for a pick-up in economic growth. With the rand having strengthened, and inflation firmly under control and heading well below the top of the inflation target of 6%, the prospects were looking good for interest rate cuts that would further boost consumer spending power and the economy in general.

Post a recent investment conference hosted in March, where foreign investors met a broad array of local companies, it was clear that this confidence was shared: share prices of most SA-specific companies rose as foreign investors started backing the recovery with investment into the country. The rand strengthened further and bond yields dropped to a remarkable 8.2%; remarkable, as generally global bond yields were rising, not falling. All indications were that SA was pulling itself back on track post the shake-up in December 2015 when markets were shocked by Nenegate – the firing of finance minister Nhlanhla Nene and his replacement with little-known backbencher Desmond van Rooyen.

With this improved confidence would come stronger economic growth, which drives investment, which in turn would bring with it jobs and improving financial results, which then would boost overall tax revenues.

The ANC elective conference in December 2017 was the main risk to this improved outlook, with a clear high road/ low road scenario depending on which faction within the ANC would come out on top. By mid-March, it still seemed that either faction had equal odds of winning the elective conference and setting ANC policy for the next five years.

All of this was completely derailed on Thursday 30 March. In a surreal event, a midnight cabinet reshuffle was orchestrated, apparently without involving any of the senior members of the ANC national executive committee. The ANC secretary general was so shocked as to publicly state, "This reshuffle

was not done in consultation with the ANC, we were given a list that was done elsewhere and then it was given to us"1. Ten ministers and ten deputy ministers were fired or moved to different portfolios, and a number of new members, many of whom are fairly unknown, were introduced. The main blow to the economy was the removal of both the finance minister and his deputy, despite their sterling job in staving off a ratings downgrade and delivering a properly funded budget, notwithstanding the economic challenges SA faced in the past year. They were replaced with Malusi Gigaba, previously minister of public enterprises and more recently home affairs, and Sfiso Buthelezi, a relatively unknown backbencher who was an advisor to Zuma prior to his rise to the presidency. Interestingly, two of the new appointees, Gigaba and the new minister of police, Fikile Mbalula, were both past presidents of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL).

There has been much speculation as to where the new names came from, and what the intentions of all these various ministers will be. One can read plenty about their past connections and foibles in the popular press. It is more important to deal with the factual results of these appointments and what the economic impact will be. Perhaps most telling is the response of the current president of the ANCYL to ratings downgrades following these announcements: "We are welcoming the junk status. When the economy rises again, it will be held by us." The move to junk is nothing to be welcomed, and expectations of a rising economy an example of naivety in the extreme.

THE REAL EFFECTS

Since the cabinet changes, the yield on the benchmark 10-year government bond has pushed up to 9% and the rand has fallen from its recent peak of R12.20 to the dollar to R13.80. Domestic interest rate-sensitive companies like banks and retailers have fallen by 10% to 15%. Expectations of rate cuts and a return to economic growth are disappearing and inflation is no longer going to ease as expected. Why is this the case?

¹ Business Day 31 March 2017



Regardless of all the conspiracy theories doing the rounds about looming special deals for connected parties, we know that the president and new ministers are now talking about radical economic transformation. These are the kinds of words and policies used by politicians with falling ratings to try to drum up support from the electorate. While it might succeed in appeasing the electorate, the only transformation to the economy is going to be a deterioration, ultimately impacting those self-same voters the most. Slicing up a pie in different ways does not grow the pie, but is certain to cause it to shrink.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which have been mismanaged and have consumed billions of rands over the past decade, are likely to be topped up by a newly compliant Treasury. This alone will increase the government debt burden by billions of rands. Ratings agencies have been very wary of these institutions, given their potential to massively increase the debt burden of all South Africans. Over and above all of this, the mooted project to build six to eight nuclear reactors, with a projected cost exceeding R1 trillion, appears to be on track again. Under Gordhan, the National Treasury had been steadfastly blocking this project as unnecessary and unaffordable. Post his removal, Treasury is now supportive of it progressing, despite the fact that following demand-side measures and the two new coal-fired power stations coming on line, SA now has significant surplus power capacity. SA has gross debt to GDP levels of 51% (rising to 61% if guarantees issued to SOEs are included). If all existing SOE debt is included, it rises to 69%, and with a potential R1 trillion nuclear build, debt to GDP exceeds 90%. Should this happen, we would be in a debt trap death spiral.

The reaction of two of the global ratings agencies to these changes has been swift and brutal. Our foreign debt ratings have been slashed to subinvestment grade (junk), with immediate impact on the cost of our funding. This is not something only affecting the arcane world of finance, but also has real punitive effects on every South African. As the cost of funding our debt goes up, it takes away valuable resources that could be used to fund social services, healthcare and education. It also results in a decline in the value of existing SA bonds, impacting millions of pensioners. We expect the remaining ratings agency (Moody's) to cut our foreign debt rating in the next few months. Meanwhile, SA debt has already been ejected from the JP Morgan Investment Grade Index. The biggest risk is still outstanding, however. Only one of the ratings agencies (Fitch) has moved our local currency debt rating to junk. Should another ratings agency cut this rating to junk, we will be ejected from the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index, resulting in the forced sale of approximately \$5 billion of SA bonds. Should Moody's and Standard & Poor's downgrade our local currency bonds to junk status, we will be ejected from the Citi World Government Bond Index, triggering the forced sale of some \$9 billion of our bonds. (At current exchange rates, this represents a cumulative outflow of R193 billion from the bond market.)

Do not hold your breath for any BRICS-friendly ratings agency to make an iota of a difference. As Warren Buffett famously said, never ask a barber whether you need a haircut. Similarly, global investors will not be swayed by the biased views of such an agency.

After Gordhan was reappointed as finance minister following the shock of Nenegate, corporate SA rallied around the National Treasury to deliver work streams to prevent a ratings downgrade and to drive economic growth through targeted investments in small businesses and various programmes designed to assist in alleviating service delivery and poverty. By and large, these initiatives were successful, certainly in managing the ratings agencies and in the establishment of a R1 billion fund to support SME development. Without a doubt these initiatives were instrumental in staving off the downgrade. As the Treasury shifts its focus to providing more funding to SOEs, including the unaffordable nuclear build, and amid its stated support for radical economic transformation, these initiatives are likely to stagnate and ultimately will be undone.

Given that the foreseeable outcomes of the radical cabinet changes, pushed through against the wishes of many senior ANC members, are all negative, why has the market reaction not been as negative as when Nene was fired? It is not obvious, but a couple of possibilities exist. Firstly, the sell-off after Nenegate proved a great buying opportunity as the market swung from despair to hope when Gordhan took control of the Treasury. Bonds and domestic shares, which were hardest hit, generated some of the best returns in 2016 as the market started to believe in the SA economic recovery story. There is definitely an element of hope playing out in markets currently where investors are buying these same assets in the hope that fiscal discipline is not going to be lost.

Secondly, as mentioned, the first quarter of 2017 was showing promising signs of recovery and many foreign investors were encouraged by a nascent economic turnaround. They may be viewing this sell-off as an opportunity to invest, not realising the significance of the change in our fiscal trajectory. All the major political surprises globally in 2016 have generally been buying opportunities, with UK and US equity markets rallying hard after their own political shocks. While South Africans are aware of how significant a blocking role the National Treasury and the incumbent finance minister had in the SA government, this is not common knowledge elsewhere.

Finally, one can only assume it is the 'frog in the pot' syndrome. According to the classic analogy, a frog thrown into a pot of boiling water will jump out in fright, saving itself, but if you put it in a pot of cold water and slowly turn up the heat, it will eventually die, not noticing the more subtle change in temperature until it is too late. Having been



through a similar event before and having heard constant threats of Gordhan's removal - have we all just become complacent to what is now, hot water?

One cannot overstate just how significant the change at the National Treasury is for SA. Since the dawn of democracy in SA, it has been a steadying force, applying fiscal conservatism as a guard against wasteful and profligate spending. The Public Finance Management Act is an important piece of legislation that required the finance ministry to have a final say in all major projects approved by other departments. Investors and all South Africans relied on the prudent actions of a well-respected finance team to control expenditure across government. If you look at countries around the world where radical government changes (led by populist parties with no fiscal restraint) have played out, the end game has been pretty predictable. Rampant growth in debt was followed by rampant printing of money and, ultimately, currency crises and defaults. While Zimbabwe is the obvious example, we have seen the same across many Latin American countries like Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina. This is playing with fire, and it does not end well for the economy and the people.

PORTFOLIO IMPLICATIONS

We have for some time been managing our strategies with a high allocation to offshore assets. Most of our asset allocation strategies with mandates to invest offshore are at their maximum regulatory or mandated levels. Within our domestic equity allocation we have more recently had a high weighting to companies with earnings outside of SA or driven by dollar-based revenue lines (such as mining stocks).

In early 2016, we bought a lot of domestic shares as their prices fell in excess of 30% post Nenegate. As the year progressed and these shares did well and the rand strengthened, we felt that the return opportunity was once again more favourable, outside of the purely domestic shares. Given that the moves following the recent cabinet shake-up have not been as extreme, and the fact that we think the long-term changes in fiscal strategy are far less benign, we are not inclined to increase our purely domestic weighting.

Bonds, both globally and locally, have not looked attractive on a risk-return basis since the global financial crisis. We have avoided global bonds and, other than some tactical buying post Nenegate, we have generally avoided local bonds as well, due to our assessment that the yields did not offer sufficient return for the risk involved. We have preferred property instead where yields were as attractive, and well-managed companies are able to grow distributions in line or ahead of inflation. We have not been tempted to buy domestic bonds as yet given our concerns over the likelihood of our debt burden rising significantly and necessitating further debt issuance outside of the long-term projections of the budget office.

Our funds have performed well in volatile times, and the first quarter of 2017 has not been different. We have built portfolios based on a careful assessment of maximising returns at an acceptable level of risk. Still, this is cold comfort for the millions of South Africans facing a much bleaker future today as result of a stagnating economy and the reduced resources available for meeting social services.





FUELLED BY FEAR

THE RISE IN POPULISM AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT

By Marie Antelme

Marie is an economist within the fixed interest investment unit. She joined Coronation in 2014 after working for UBS AG, First South Securities and Credit Suisse First Boston.



Brexit, the recent election of Donald Trump as US president and the upsurge in Eurosceptic parties over recent years are widely deemed indicative of a rise in 'populism'. This umbrella term is hard to define: the representation of a populist political 'left' and the policies it is likely to implement will be different from a populist 'right'. Another challenge is distinguishing between politics that may give rise to dangerous isolationist and divisive policies, and a more moderate representation of the interests of vulnerable groups. Using the term carelessly risks ignoring some of the nastier characteristics that have accompanied truly populist politics in the past. More often than not, political parties representing minority interests - the economically excluded or downtrodden, and a range of interests in-between - are labelled populist when this may not necessarily be the case.

WHAT IS POPULISM?

We have all read headlines in the past months about the politics of anger, but beneath the anger is always fear. Having established that there is no single definition of populism, and no common ideology that defines populist politics, it helps to distinguish between the ends of the spectrum and identify a number of common traits.

In today's language, 'leftist' political populism would likely see lower- and middle-income voters stand against a wealthy, politically powerful and economically influential elite - movements akin to the labour movements of the past. 'Rightist' populism is more likely to see the same groups uniting against an elite accused of protecting or supporting outsiders - movements characterised by antiimmigrant, racially resentful politics. This is an 'us and them' kind of politics, which holds the politically influential elite to ransom for a range of grievances, with a particular focus on foreigners or minorities. In both cases, the people most likely to vote for a populist party or candidate tend to be economically vulnerable - those who are older, have experienced job losses or income stagnation, or feel they face a threat to their social or national identity, survival, livelihood or personal wellbeing.

There are other shared characteristics, aside from a broad division of the population into 'the people' and 'the elites'. Populist movements tend to show fierce antagonism towards intellectuals (today's 'liberal elite'), favouring instinct over education. They champion polarising, divisive views and generally display contempt for the judiciary, and possibly also for the military and other political powers (such as government intelligence). Protectionist trade policies tend to feature, along with a willingness to implement capital controls and nationalise assets. There is usually also a strong intolerance of a free press.

POLITICS WITH A LIVELY PAST

Populist 'uprisings' are not uncommon – especially in the US. During the late 19th century, the farmers and labourers who constituted the People's Party in the US (also known as the Populist Party, or simply The Populists) united against capitalist interests perceived to be driving inequality. The party called for the nationalisation of essential economic infrastructure – notably the railways – and was very critical of private banking.

Over time, the People's Party joined other labour movements, and in 1896 endorsed a Democratic candidate, who swept to victory through the People's Party's constituencies. Having lost its independent identity with this endorsement, the party never really recovered. However, a number of US presidents who have followed have favoured 'populist' policies as part of their election platform – most recently (and visibly) president Trump.

By the early 20th century, a new wave of populism emerged in Europe, which became more intense during the mid-war period, undoubtedly fuelled by the economics of post-World War I Europe, the Great Depression and the trade wars that coincided at the time. The political climate was characterised by nationalism in France and Francisco Franco's Spain, fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, especially between the two world wars as 'rightist' populism fuelled the rise of the National Socialist German Workers' Party under Adolf Hitler.



FUROPE: GDP BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS



Source: New Maddison Project Database

THE MODERN HISTORY

After World War II, populism faded with the careful, deliberate integration of social and political policies by Western governments of the time. In fact, the past 40 years or so have been an anomaly, with very little populist political activity globally (outside of Latin America) and almost no populist activity in developed economies.


Most notably, in the aftermath of World War II, the US, UK and European governments consciously implemented a strategy to ensure that economic development was strong and integrated enough to prevent such a war from ever happening again. For these countries, this meant that domestic policy initially focused on creating jobs and getting people employed. The success of this combined effort was the 'golden era' of growth in the 1950s and 1960s, when employment (primarily through union jobs in manufacturing) ensured rising wages, healthy gains in output and advancements in technology. But the economics were not all good: full employment led to rising wages, which fuelled inflation.

During this time, foreign policy - especially trade policy - actively promoted more open, integrated systems. Globalisation re-accelerated after the war, with the Bretton Woods agreement committing 44 countries to an integrated, gold-linked currency system that facilitated trade convertibility and established the US dollar as a reserve currency. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were established in 1945; the IMF to monitor foreign exchange movements and facilitate reserve lending (trade), and the World Bank to aid wartorn countries' rehabilitation. Technological advancement helped the world become more accessible, as container ships improved the speed and cost at which goods could be moved. In an effort to form the International Trade Organisation (the precursor of the World Trade Organisation), 23 nations signed a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947.

These programmes were initially very successful. However, by the mid-1970s, high inflation led to somewhat of a revolt by the creditors within Western economies – the investors, banks and wealthier households. With the election of Margaret Thatcher as British prime minister in 1979 and Ronald Reagan as US president in 1980, there came a shift in economic policy focus – both leaders actively pursued policies to lower inflation and break trade unionism, benefiting the wealthy more than the indebted workers. ("Low-priced Asian manufacturers cost less. Unions are bad!")

GLOBALISATION CYCLES THROUGH HISTORY

Trade openness*



* Calculated as exports + imports as a % of GDP for 17 economies, aggregated using GDP-PPP weights. 3-year moving average.

Sources: Barclays, National Bureau of Economic Research macrohistory database


Since the late 1970s, economic policy in developed Western economies has been dominated by a move to inflation-fighting monetary policy, a prolonged trend of falling interest rates and the disintegration of trade union movements. Globalisation also picked up pace, with Asia opening to trade and a visible acceleration in trade agreements. Overall, the period was very good for 'creditors' but bad for households with debt, mostly in the middle classes. The process has also been reinforcing: as 'creditors' have benefited, their political preferences have been reflected in the elected leaders of most Western countries.

This has left many voters disenfranchised. A well-known study by economist Branko Milanovic introduced the so-called 'Elephant Chart', an insightful snapshot of the impact this process has had on global incomes. Between 1988 and 2008, the combination of lower inflation (and interest rates) and trade openness led to an increase in real incomes for almost everyone in the world ... except the middle classes of the West. For these people – many of whom are male, middle-income earners and perhaps less educated in the post-war industrial era – income remained almost unchanged for 30 years.



The acceleration in credit growth from the early 2000s enabled these households to live beyond their stagnant means and to accumulate wealth as housing and other asset prices boomed. The market crash in 2009 – and in particular, the housing market collapse and spike in unemployment in the US and, to a lesser degree, the UK – was devastating. Despite the best efforts of economic policy, income was lost. So too were wealth and social identity, while fear crept in.

CHANGE IN REAL INCOME BETWEEN 1988 AND 2008



Source: Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalisation, Branko Milanovic

While covering the history behind the rise in modern populist politics across a broad spectrum, it bears remembering that the circumstances affecting individual countries differ. So too do the issues that are fuelling current voter unhappiness. In the US, Trump's standpoint is somewhat of a mixture of populist policies, as he takes his cue from both the 'leftist' Rust Belt and 'rightist' anti-Mexican/anti-Chinese sentiment. In the UK, France and the Netherlands, lost wealth, stagnant incomes, immigration and the oppressive weight of governmental fiscal burdens – especially in the EU, where economic health differs so widely by country – are all aggravating factors.

In SA, the turning political tide bears worrying characteristics of other populist regimes, which are all increasingly visible: the antagonism towards intellectuals, xenophobia, challenges to a free press, interference with institutions and the judiciary, a rejection of conservative Western economic policies, demands to capture or nationalise private assets and an 'us' versus 'them' rhetoric.

WHAT IS NEXT?

History has not judged populist governments kindly - and with good reason. In many cases, populist policies were initially successful: growth accelerated and government

spending fuelled investment. But excesses were hard to fund and reign in. Skyrocketing inflation and currency collapse have tended to be the catalysts for populist regimes' downfalls, but the rehabilitation of fiscal and external accounts, and the rebuilding of institutions, take time – and come at great economic cost.

The experience of countries such as Chile in the 1970s and Peru in the 1980s is instructive. Both countries had experienced a period of economic hardship. The promise of radical economic change to an impoverished electorate saw the election of (two different kinds of) populist candidates in Salvador Allende in Chile and Alan García in Peru. Economic reform achieved under IMF programmes, limited as it was, created sufficient economic headroom for both leaders to implement highly expansionary economic agendas focused on the redistribution of income and the restructuring of the economy. In both cases, conservative policies were actively rejected. Among the economic justifications was a consensus that fiscal risk was exaggerated, or even unfounded. Although successful at first - employment and wages rose, inflation moderated and economic growth accelerated - bottlenecks ultimately emerged as domestic demand expanded rapidly, and import demand with it, putting pressure on reserves. Inflation, exchange controls and deteriorating fiscal balances led to shortages over time, and ultimately, to unstable politics and economic collapse.

SA may well be at risk of repeating some of these mistakes. Certainly, recent changes in key policymakers and the reiteration of the ruling party's commitment to 'radical economic transformation' echoes the party mandates of Chile and Peru to a degree. How this commitment translates into policy changes and a new economic agenda remains to be seen, but any large-scale utilisation of state funds on unaffordable infrastructure may well precipitate an increasingly unsustainable fiscal (and external) position.

Globally, the biggest challenge for the world today is not the immediate economic impact of Brexit, or the future of the US under a Trump administration. Rather, it is the realisation that the neoliberal order that has dominated economic and political policy agendas over the past 70 years is at best under threat, and at worst breaking down. In some cases, policy reviews may not be a bad thing.

Countries with ageing populations (like the US and many European countries) need a pragmatic, agreed policy on immigration. In Europe, failure to agree on fiscal and banking integration has hamstrung the finely crafted union. In the UK, discontent over service delivery, economic stagnation and liberal immigration policies require all these issues to be re-examined. More broadly, the failure of economies to grow inclusively after the global financial crisis might necessitate a review of crisis-related legislation.



Importantly, the demands of populist electorates in the US, Brexiteers in the UK and Eurosceptics across Europe need to be considered and addressed by mainstream parties. The problem is that these parties may find it difficult to address the institutional and economic issues that have fuelled the rise in populism in the first place. Finding the right kind of jobs – with sufficient pay – in a world of integrated supply chains and disruptive technologies, while providing effective social support as populations age, sounds impossible. But failure to do so will further threaten moderate political legitimacy.

Arguably, Europe is in the most challenging position here. Both the US and UK have political and economic levers to pull, which Europe does not. It is easier for the US and the UK to replace their leadership within an election cycle,

should economic outcomes disappoint. This may result in a more moderate (but still protectionist), nationalistic approach to domestic policies than we have seen. It will not fix the problem, but it could ultimately affect the process. In Europe, the reform process – in fact, almost any process – is hampered by unequal economies, and the disintermediation of politics and fiscal policy.

Unless there is an adequate response by moderate governments, macroeconomic performance improves and the fear that is fuelled by loss of income abates, the populists will continue to gain ground. While the initial response of markets and even economies may be positive, history suggests that poorly coordinated policies in a multipolar world are not good for growth, and may have severe unintended consequences.



RISK THE NUMBER YOU NEVER SEE

By Karl Leinberger

Karl was appointed CIO in 2008. He joined Coronation in 2000 as an equity analyst and was made head of research in 2005. He manages the Coronation Houseview portfolios.



"Competition can be pretty intense when your competitors play like they can never get hurt." – Seth Klarman

"Our predictors may be good at predicting the ordinary, but not the irregular, and this is where they ultimately fail ... What matters is not how often you are right but how large your cumulative errors are. And these cumulative errors depend largely on the big surprises, the big opportunities." - Nassim Taleb

The primary objective in investing is to deliver the best risk-adjusted returns possible. Since return and risk are two sides of the same coin, an interrogation of one without a full understanding of the other is meaningless (and dangerous).

Return is, of course, the easy one. We all know what returns any given security, portfolio or fund manager has delivered in the past. Although future returns are a guess (albeit an educated one), historic returns are fact.

Risk is another story. Winston Churchill once described Russia as a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.

He could so easily have been speaking on the topic of risk. I say this because:

- · Opinions differ on what risk is.
- Measuring it presents some challenges.
- In contrast to return, risk remains an opinion as much after the event (ex-post) as it was before (ex-ante).

WHAT IS RISK?

In financial theory, risk is typically defined as volatility. It is this axiomatic assumption we have to thank for the plethora of betas, Sharpe/Sortino ratios and tracking errors we have in our industry. At Coronation, we disagree. We define risk as the possibility of permanently losing capital. Warren Buffett has this to say on the distinction: "... now if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation \$40 million instead of \$80 million, then its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly *Alice in Wonderland*. I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy \$400 million worth of properties for \$40 million than \$80 million."



The irony is that risk (of losing money) is often highest at times when volatility is low and complacency abounds. A Minsky moment refers to the risks that often bubble under the surface in extended periods of prosperity. In this environment, asset values typically rise. This often leads to increased confidence, which then fuels speculation and increased levels of leverage. Good recent examples of this include the US housing bubble and the commodity bubble in the mid-noughties. On both occasions volatility was at historically low levels at a time of great risk (of losing money) to investors.

The conventional definition of risk implies that a portfolio full of cash has high active risk and the likelihood of a high tracking error. We would counter that the risk of the investor losing his/her money is low.

I should qualify my comments by saying that I think that volatility does have some informational value. I even think that it gives some indication of the riskiness of a security or a portfolio. But I do not think it is a proxy for risk, and I certainly do not think that volatility equals risk. I think the reason the investment industry picked the volatility definition of risk is its lack of ambiguity. Seth Klarman, head of Boston-based hedge fund Baupost Group, recently said, "Wall Street is a place that highly confident people go to work". He could have added 'highly numerate' to that description.

Our industry is full of highly numerate people – and for the person with a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Volatility is a number that is easy to understand and easy to observe. It does not enter the murky realm of opinion (which the alternative definition does). Volatility is a hard fact, and I think that is why our industry backs it.

HOW CAN ONE MEASURE RISK?

The bad news is, I do not think one can.

Fortunately, as American baseball legend Yogi Berra said, you can observe a lot just by watching:

- Returns over the very long term. Although returns achieved over a short assessment period reveal little, inadequate risk management should be exposed over long periods. The bad news is that I think the required assessment period is beyond the patience of most observers. (I am thinking here of at least 10 years.)
- Inflection points in major cycles. As Buffett so famously said, it is only when the tide goes out that you see who was swimming naked. For example, high exposure to US financials or commodity stocks in the mid- to late-noughties looked prescient at the time, but was subsequently exposed as momentum investing when the cycle turned with little regard for the risk of losing clients' their money, permanently.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT THAT RISK IS AN OPINION AND NOT A FACT?

Sometimes, explanations can be more helpful than definitions. My favourite explanation of risk is Elroy Dimson's: "More things can happen than will happen."

Human beings are consummate storytellers. Even in an impartial telling of history, we tend to give too little recognition to the fact that while events played out in one way, they could so easily have played out in another. Nothing ruins a good story more than the spoilsport who dwells too long on an inconvenient nuance or the role that happenstance played in the final result. How different would the world we live in be had Adolf Hitler or Mao Zedong not been born, or had the Bolsheviks not prevailed in what was a fragmented and disorganised Russian revolution?

Although our brains are wired to think that the passing of time reveals all, we need to keep reminding ourselves that it does not. All we ever get to know is which one of the multiple possible sequences of events that could have played out actually did, and who profited from that coincidence. While the passing of time may reveal some of the risks that were lurking beneath the surface, we never get to know what all the risks were and how easily they might have come to pass. That is why I say that although returns will always be a fact, risk will always be an opinion. It is something to think about in an industry obsessed with performance league tables that tell you exactly what returns were delivered, but nothing about the risk taken to deliver them.

HOW DOES CORONATION MANAGE RISK?

Managing risk is not something that you should have to clear at the final hurdle in an investment process. We believe it needs to be woven into the DNA of the process, as we endeavour to do in ours.

- 1. In the research process:
 - Through a strong valuation discipline (i.e. paying less for assets than they are intrinsically worth) and a long time horizon (i.e. looking through the cycle). Together, these are a great defence against the risk of getting sucked in at the top of the cycle, when prices are high and the risk of permanent capital loss is pronounced.
 - Through a bias to quality. We demand significantly higher margins of safety for poor-quality companies, because high-quality companies generally surprise with their growth over long periods and tend to provide the best downside protection in tough economic times. In times of adversity, it is the poor-quality companies that suffer most. High-quality companies are more resilient, and often come out of tough times in a competitively stronger position than they went in with. There is no



doubt that this quality bias has resulted in us leaving some return on the table over the years (a situation we are very comfortable with). We will always take a lowrisk 30% over a high-risk 50% return. A good example would be gold stocks, which have presented many compelling trading opportunities over the years. We have avoided all of them, because we fundamentally think that they are cyclical, low-return businesses that can always halve just as easily as they can double.

2. In the portfolio construction process:

- We spend as much time thinking through portfolio construction as we do researching securities. Knowing what weighting to give a security is just as important as identifying which securities deserve to make it into the portfolio. We have spent years refining our own proprietary tools to understand overall portfolio positioning, exposure to key risk factors and the risk of unintended bets in a portfolio. The research process will always be the first defence in the risk management process. The portfolio construction process may be a little less sexy and more difficult to articulate, but its contribution is just as significant.
- We believe in diversification. One often hears Buffett's famous comment that diversification results in 'diworsification'. I (respectfully) believe that quote to be somewhat misinterpreted. The 'benchmark hugger' that owns everything in the index clearly adds no value and does nothing but 'diworsify'. However, we believe that a diversified portfolio of undervalued assets is the best defence that any investor has against an uncertain future and markets that eventually humble us all. For this reason, although our portfolios will always represent the high conviction views coming

out of our research process, they will always seek to achieve diversification across sectors, geographies and asset classes (where possible).

3. In our cultural values:

- Through a team-based investment process. It is the job of every person in our team to challenge the Coronation portfolio DNA that underpins all our portfolios. As an investment house that has not hedged its bets through multiple teams, boutiques or investment styles, we have no other horses in the race. We simply cannnot afford a low-probability, high-impact event (Nassim Taleb's 'black swan') to derail our portfolios.
- We have deep respect for the fact that no one knows the future. It is a key principle that underpins our investment process. As was appropriately articulated by economist Edgar R. Fiedler, "He who lives by the crystal ball soon learns to eat ground glass". Although we value securities and construct portfolios using a base case scenario, we continually stress-test those assumptions with alternative scenarios.

Ultimately, all investors are judged by their results. A good investment process and an experienced team certainly help, but ultimately it is the runs on the scoreboard that count. We understand this. But at the same time, our clients can find comfort in the fact that we do not get sucked into the temptation to push for returns at the expense of risk. In fact, the converse is true. We live by the maxim that it is often what you get wrong, not what you get right, that defines your long-term track record in investments. For this reason, we leave return on the table every day in pursuit of achieving robust and antifragile portfolios that are your best defence against the uncertain world we live in.





RE-OPENING OFFERS OPPORTUNITIES

NEW INVESTORS CAN NOW ACCESS ALL OUR STRATEGIES

By Kirshni Totaram

Kirshni is global head of institutional business. She is a qualified actuary and a former manager of the Coronation Property Equity portfolio. Kirshni joined Coronation in 2000.



In 2012, Coronation closed its domestic specialist Equity, Balanced and Absolute Return strategies to new clients. At the time, these strategies represented some 80% of institutional assets under our management. It was a difficult decision, and the scope of the closure was unprecedented in SA. Looking back, we believe it was the right call.

The closure was in response to a number of years of exceptional inflows into Coronation portfolios, but enacted before we reached a point where the size of the assets under our management impeded our ability to outperform the market. At the time the decision was taken, we thought it prudent to take action long before our share became disproportionate. As an investment-led firm, we value our track record and our ability to deliver alpha far more than the total assets we have under management.

We always expected to re-open the strategies in due course, given the shrinking formal pension fund market. In recent years, assets in these funds have indeed been affected by weak employment amid prolonged economic weakness. In recent years, Coronation has also seen expected outflows materialise.

Careful consideration of the capacity this has created, together with our assessment of market conditions and our five-year forecast of industry trends, has allowed us to re-open our strategies. Coronation remains committed to deliver on the long-term performance objectives of our clients, both existing and new.

PORTFOLIOS AT A GLANCE

The newly re-opened portfolios have delivered strong returns for investors:

Global Balanced strategies

Coronation's two flagship balanced strategies for preretirement investments are the Coronation Global Houseview and Coronation Managed portfolios. The Global Houseview strategy has been managed by our CIO, Karl Leinberger, since 2005 (Sarah-Jane Alexander and Adrian Zetler are co-managers). The Coronation Managed portfolio is managed by Neville Chester (also since 2005) and Pallavi Ambekar is co-manager.

Both strategies have been ranked as top performers in their peer group:

GLOBAL BALANCED STRATEGIES

	Ranking over 1 year	Ranking over 5 years	Ranking over 7 years	Ranking over 10 years
Coronation Global Houseview	1st	1st	1st	2nd
Coronation Managed	1st	1st	1st	1st

Sources: Alexander Forbes Global Manager Watch – Dynamic (Coronation Managed) and Alexander Forbes Global Large Manager Watch survey (Coronation Global Houseview) to end-February 2017

The **Global Houseview** strategy is the top-performing balanced mandate in SA since launch, with a 23-year track record of consistent benchmark outperformance over meaningful periods – in all market conditions. It has delivered an annualised return of 16.5% per annum since inception.

The well-diversified portfolio targets long-term growth through an allocation to the most under-valued assets across all asset classes on a risk-adjusted basis, making it ideal for retirement savers. Global Houseview is managed according to the limits of Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act.

The strategy represents our best investment view for a balanced portfolio in all major asset classes – equities, property, bonds and cash, both in SA and abroad. For some time, equities have been Coronation's preferred asset class for producing inflation-beating returns. We prefer global to domestic equities on the basis of valuation. The Global Houseview strategy currently has the maximum allowable exposure offshore.



The **Coronation Managed** strategy is our most concentrated rand-denominated global balanced mandate. It has delivered an active annualised return of 17% per annum since inception, with a 20-year track record of consistent benchmark outperformance.

The portfolio, managed according to the limits of Regulation 28, is characterised by high-conviction calls and the potential for significant benchmark divergence. Given its more aggressive mandate, the Coronation Managed strategy typically has a higher allocation to risk assets and tends to have more concentrated exposures. This has helped drive outperformance over the long term. Currently, the fund has exposure to a number of compelling investment opportunities for those prepared to have a longer-term outlook.

The strategy is especially suited to retirement funds, corporate investors, trusts and foundations seeking an actively managed balanced portfolio with a long-term investment horizon.

Houseview Equity strategy

Our flagship specialist SA equity portfolio has delivered a return of 17.7% per year since its inception almost 24 years ago. This secured investors an active return (alpha, or market outperformance) of 2.9% per year. This track record has been produced during various market cycles and periods of unprecedented macro volatility.

The consistent long-term alpha produced by the strategy is unique by local and global standards. We believe this is the result of a disciplined focus on investing only in businesses that are trading at a discount to our assessment of their real long-term value. The Coronation Houseview Equity strategy has been managed by our CIO, Karl Leinberger, since 2005. Sarah-Jane Alexander manages assets within the strategy and Adrian Zetler is a co-manager.

Absolute Return strategies

Coronation was the first manager in SA to introduce absolute return strategies in 1999. These risk-managed strategies have maintained a strong track record for almost two decades. The real returns generated by the strategies, managed by

Charles de Kock (who has 31 years' investment experience) and Duane Cable (head of SA Equity), are shown below:

ABSOLUTE RETURN STRATEGIES

	Inception date	Absolute return since inception (p.a.)	Real return achieved since inception (p.a.)
Coronation Global Absolute	Aug 1999	16.1%	9.8%
Coronation Domestic Absolute	Apr 2002	15.4%	9.4%
Coronation Inflation Plus	Oct 2009	11.1%	5.7%

Returns gross of fees, as at 31 March 2017

Source: Coronation

WHAT LIES AHEAD

Coronation's investment team has enjoyed one of the lowest turnover rates in the industry. We have seen remarkable stability over the past decade, with most of our key portfolio managers remaining in place. We focus on long-term valuations and seek to take advantage of whatever attractive opportunities the market presents us to generate long-term rewards for our investors. This commitment has delivered exceptional returns: more than 95% of our institutional assets have outperformed their respective benchmarks over 10 years and 100% have outperformed their benchmarks over 20 years.

Coronation is a significant manager of retirement savings in SA. We are grateful for the loyal support we have received over the years. More than half the institutional assets under our management are from clients who have been with Coronation for more than a decade.

The re-opening of our strategies allows us new opportunities to deliver investment excellence. Over the next few months, we will release Factfiles of our various strategies to re-aquaint you with Coronation's offering. In this edition, we feature Coronation Houseview Equity on page 34. To new clients, the lengthy closure of our strategies shows that we are prepared to make difficult decisions to protect our clients' interests. We really do put our clients first, and will defend their investment outperformance above all else.





SBERBANK A NIMBLE RUSSIAN GIANT

By Lisa Haakman

Lisa is a global emerging markets equity analyst. She joined Coronation in 2016 and has 10 years' investment experience.



Investing in some shares can be like owning fine wine. They may be expensive, but are worth every cent. The finest can be kept for years, are velvety smooth, elegantly balanced, perfectly rounded, immensely satisfying to drink and continue to get better with age.

Sberbank is not that. Some would argue that owning Sberbank is more akin to drinking vodka, an experience conceivably filled with remorse, hangovers and new lows. A common misperception is that Sberbank is cheap and nasty Stoli vodka being downed on the streets. A more intimate knowledge of the company reveals something much more sophisticated. Founded in 1841, with 139 million customers, Sberbank is more Grey Goose (steeped in heritage) or Smirnoff (the largest vodka brand globally) than it is Russian Bear!

Let us put this in context. With 139 million retail customers, Sberbank is ...

- twice as big as Wells Fargo, the largest retail bank in the US:
- nearly five times the size of Lloyds Bank, the largest retail bank in the UK; and
- over 10 times as big as Standard Bank, the largest retail bank in SA.

In addition to its massive retail base, Sberbank manages 1.5 million corporate customers through 15 700 branches, 82 000 ATMs and 328 000 employees.


Sberbank has a market share of almost 40% of retail loans and 46% of retail deposits. On the corporate banking side, it has a 32% share of corporate loans and almost 23% of corporate deposits. Its nearest peer, VTB, holds only 10% of retail deposits and 22% of corporate deposits. Outside of these two players, the market is very fragmented. Consequently, Sberbank is the dominant bank in the Russian market by an order of magnitude.

Sberbank enjoys a number of competitive advantages over its peers, including a lower cost of funding and superior digital capabilities. Not only do retail deposits constitute a higher proportion of its funding base than its peers', but it also pays less on these deposits due to the perceived safety of the bank. On the digital side, the Sberbank behemoth is managed through one centralised IT system. Yes, one. Since 2008, it has invested heavily in its IT platform, rationalising its IT infrastructure from over 2 500 systems to a single system today, a phenomenal feat by any global standard.

As a result of its scale and its IT system, Sberbank has one of the lowest cost-to-income ratios of any universal bank, at only 39.7% (its peer group would be immensely proud of a number sub-50%). Consequently, Sberbank is able to price loans substantially lower than competitors to earn the same return on assets, resulting in positive selection for itself and negative selection for the peer group.

In addition, big data analytics have resulted in significant time savings in decision-making, and a 98% reduction in processing time. Almost 34 million customers are using the web or the Sberbank app as their primary banking channel


SBERBANK BRANCH COUNT



Source: Sberbank



SBERBANK HEADCOUNT



Source: Sherbank

and a staggering 91% of all transactions are now conducted via digital channels or ATMs. As a result, Sberbank is in a position to start reducing and rationalising both its branch footprint and its staff headcount.

In the fullness of time, management believe they can reduce the number of branches by 25% and the headcount by at least 50%. This then becomes a virtuous circle, reducing Sberbank's cost-to-income ratio further and rendering its peers even less competitive.


This world-class cost-to-income ratio is one of the primary reasons Sberbank enjoys one of the highest returns on equity (ROE) of any bank globally, currently almost 21%. There is scope to increase this ROE further, yet the share trades at only 1.1 times forward book, well below its fair value.

In addition, Sberbank carries optionality via a potential joint venture with one of the world's internet giants. Yandex, Mail.ru (Naspers) and AliExpress.ru (Alibaba) have all engaged in discussions with Sberbank to serve as the backbone of its e-commerce platform in Russia. To date, none of these negotiations has resulted in a deal; however, should such a deal emerge, this would represent significant upside that we are not paying for at the current price.

As banks increasingly become indistinguishable from technology companies, we believe we are backing a winner. Over and above a superior cloud-based IT system, Sberbank is already piloting blockchain, machine learning and artificial intelligence 'bots', each of which could make a significant positive impact on both the customer experience and the cost to serve. Many of Sberbank's products, such as Smartkassa, have changed the way small businesses operate, offering online payments, card payments, accounting, reporting, customer relationship management and other banking services in a single point-of-sale device.

The bank has a very long runway for growth, evidenced by Russia's low banking penetration by global standards - domestic credit is 59.3% of GDP compared with the OECD average of 109% of GDP. In addition, the nonbanking financial services market (insurance, wealth management and pension management) is in its infancy. Sberbank has plans to capture market share in the underpenetrated mortgage market, and with respect to the nonbanking financial services industry will likely create a market that currently is almost nonexistent. By way of comparison, Sberbank currently operates the largest asset manager in the country with a market share of 24%, yet manages only \$15 billion of assets. To put this in perspective, Coronation has more assets under management than all of Russia. Also, Sberbank is the largest life insurer in Russia, with a market share of 29% - yet premium income was only \$1 billion in 2016. Total insurance premiums represent only 1% of GDP, extraordinarily low even for emerging market countries, as per the International Monetary Fund data below.

INSURANCE DENSITY AND PENETRATION IN EMERGING MARKETS (2015)



Source: Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting



We believe Sberbank is best placed to capture these opportunities.

Still, we acknowledge the risks involved in being a minority shareholder in a state-owned bank, especially in Russia. However, under the capable leadership of Herman Gref, CEO since 2007, minority shareholders have been fiercely protected. The macro environment, while always prone to

shocks, is improving, and the likelihood is that sanctions against Russia will be eased over time. Nevertheless, we factor these risks into our valuation. The share is trading at 5.5 times our estimated 2017 earnings and 1.1 times our estimate of 2017 net asset value, and carries a dividend yield of almost 4%. On this basis, we believe the share is very attractively priced and we are optimistic that future returns will be cause for celebration. Na zdorov'ye!



MTN DOWN BUT NOT OUT

by Pallavi Ambekar

Pallavi joined Coronation in 2003 and manages assets within Coronation's Aggressive Equity Strategy. She has 14 years' investment experience.



"He who is not courageous enough to take risks will accomplish nothing in life." - Muhammad Ali

MTN came out of 2016 battered and bruised. The \$5.2 billion fine on its Nigerian operations over unregistered SIM cards dealt a massive blow to its image as an African champion in mobile telephony. However, Nigeria was not MTN's only hot spot last year. Many of its other operations also battled weakening economies as well as governments that were keen to bolster fiscal revenues by targeting cash-rich corporate entities. In addition to increasing regulatory demands for customer SIM card registration, MTN found itself subject to additional taxes and obligations in some markets to localise ownership of its subsidiaries. Internally, the company was attempting to stabilise its senior management team and to catch up on data network investment in key markets. Difficulties around the fine were compounded by constraints on extracting cash out of Nigeria, and there were concerns about the sustainability of the company's dividend payment.

Recently released annual results for the year ended December 2016 saw continued pressure on MTN's earnings, reflecting the tough environment and internal turmoil at the company. It did, however, manage to keep to its commitment to pay out a R7 dividend for the full year, and has committed to keep this flat for the 2017 financial year. With the fine settlement behind it and the rebasing of earnings, MTN now faces a critical turning point to prove whether it can capitalise on the still latent growth opportunity in its operations. It is certainly well equipped to do so. It commands strong, leading positions in most of its regions. It can also use tough times to entrench its moat by investing in infrastructure,

while its competitors struggle with financing. With proper management execution, we think the next leg of growth for MTN will be delivered over the coming few years.

Historic growth witnessed in MTN's early years was driven by entering virgin markets and building scale and coverage quickly. MTN enjoyed first-mover advantage, which resulted in it easily obtaining a large customer base that previously had very little access to communication. Once the business had built scale, however, it struggled with transitioning from an entrepreneurial operation to a professional organisation. Management's focus on cost efficiencies and cash generation came at the expense of network investment in data capacity and providing customers with high-quality service. As a result, the company allowed competitors to take valuable market share.

The Nigerian fine was a significant shock. While it was a major negative event, we think it forced the board into taking fundamental strategic steps to address complacency. The introduction of a new, experienced senior management team will enhance the ability of the company to deliver on its growth potential. These new appointments bring fresh energy to the company. They are also capable of addressing the underlying issues on a clean-slate basis, without any ties to legacy thinking.

Future growth in MTN will come from three areas:

- managing the existing base business better;
- accelerating the growth of new adjacent revenue streams;
 and
- good capital allocation.



RECENT APPOINTMENTS AT MTN*

Name	Position	Announcement	Office start date	Former key position
Rob Shuter	President/CEO	Jun 16	Mar 17	Served as head of Vodafone's European cluster
Ralph Mupita	CFO	Oct 16	Apr 17	CFO of Old Mutual Emerging Markets
Jens Schulte Bockum	Group COO	Dec 16	Jan 17	CEO of Vodafone Germany
Bernice Samuels	Group CMO	Dec 16	Jan 17	Marketing officer at MTN (SA) and First National Bank; Executive Director of Strategy and Business Development at SABMiller in SA
Oliver Fortuin	Enterprise segment head	Dec 16	Mar 17	CEO of BT Global Services sub-Saharan Africa
Felleng Sekha	Executive for regulatory affairs and public policy	Oct 16	Oct 16	Various roles in MTN including executive director for corporate services in Nigeria
Stephen van Coller	M&A/Strategy head	Jul 16	Oct 16	Barclays Africa head of investment
Kholekile Ndamase	Deputy head M&A	Jul 16	Sept 16	Led equity-based financing business at Rand Merchant Bank
Godfrey Motsa	Vice-president for South and East Africa	Jun 16	Jul 16	Vodacom's chief officer for consumer business
Babak Fouladi	Group executive for technology and information systems	May 16	May 16	CTO of Vodafone Spain
Giovanni Chiarelli	CTIO of MTN SA	Nov 16	Nov 16	CTO of Vodafone Romania

^{*}Highlighted management members were at Vodafone previously.


Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Research

While MTN has built a big business, it has not made the most of leveraging its scale. It has done some work to improve purchasing power in network equipment and handsets, but it has not been able to put in place a central steering function that is able to give coordinated direction to each of the operational companies. The new management team will implement this central model, which will enable regions to drive market strategies quickly and intelligently. Management is also focused on the very basics of network deployment, and is looking to improve network availability by using spectrum more efficiently and increasing 4G tower rollout (which will improve data capacity). These actions were first implemented in SA and Nigeria, and will be implemented in other operations during 2017. Network improvements will be coupled with the standardisation of business metrics and the upgrading of IT systems, which will allow for greater customer and business analytics. Combined, the increased quality of service and enhanced management information should enable MTN to grow market share and accelerate data revenue growth.

While business basics are being addressed, there is also a clear opportunity to grow revenue streams that are complementary to basic voice and data services. Smartphone penetration in MTN's main markets is set to increase as handsets become more affordable. Customers are also using these handsets to perform more transactions and consume more content. MTN has already rolled out some of these services (music, gaming and mobile money) and they are growing strongly, with reported revenue growth of 44% (off a low base) in 2016.

This is not uncharted territory. Safaricom in Kenya is a good example of how a mobile telephony business can successfully leverage its scale to grow into a new category. M-Pesa (Safaricom's mobile money product) has 16.6 million active subscribers, and mobile money now contributes 22% of Safaricom's total revenues. MTN has 20 million mobile money subscribers, concentrated mostly in Ghana and Cameroon. We do not expect MTN to replicate the full success of Safaricom across all of its operations, but there is potential to capture more of the financial services income stream in Africa. This will come via the rollout of mobile money products into more countries (mobile money is only in five of MTN's operating countries at the moment) and the launch of new financial products (such as remittances, microlending and savings products) in addition to basic payments and airtime purchases.

SMARTPHONE PENETRATION IN MTN'S KEY MARKETS STILL LOW



Source: MTN 2016 annual results release



We expect these initiatives to support healthy organic earnings growth over the medium term. In addition, as the company comes out of a heavy capital expenditure cycle, it will convert a high percentage of earnings into cash flows. The business has a good track record of cash conversion – over the past 10 years it has converted about 85% of its earnings into cash. This will be supportive of growth in dividend payments to shareholders.

There is also the opportunity to realise further value from the future sale of tower investment assets and digital investments. The current share price attributes little to no value to these investments, and presents another leg of optionality in the investment case. Some market participants believe MTN is a broken business. We do not think this is the case. The company has weathered a particularly nasty period but has come out of it focused and better equipped to deal with a complex environment. The earnings base is low, and expectations are not high. We acknowledge that there are risks in how this investment case plays out, but feel that these risks are more than adequately discounted in the current share price. Our analysis of past case studies shows that investors tend to underestimate the upside case when new management teams come into undermanaged businesses with good fundamentals. In an uncertain investment environment, we think that MTN presents a powerful combination of attractive fundamentals and self-help initiatives, at an undemanding valuation.



FORMALISING THE INFORMAL

OPPORTUNITIES IN FRONTIER MARKETS

By Gregory Longe

Gregory is an investment analyst within the Global Frontiers investment unit. He joined Coronation in February 2013 after completing his audit training at Ernst & Young.



After a tough week – or even a particularly good one – indulging in a guilty pleasure brings enjoyment to millions across the globe. In a high-end bar in London, it may be an e-cigarette paired with a top-shelf whiskey or craft gin (served with Fever-Tree tonic water, of course). In a shebeen in Lusaka, it might be a scud of Chibuku. In Colombo, a beedi and a cup of toddy. The location and refreshments may differ, but the ritual remains the same – and businesses built around meeting these needs have become some of the largest and most successful in the world. It is no surprise then that shareholders in these global giants have been handsomely rewarded.

Our Global Frontiers strategies look to invest in the emerging markets of tomorrow. These are countries characterised by tremendous opportunity and strong economic growth, but also by low levels of economic development. Infrastructure is often poor, banking penetration low and formal retail limited. Out of necessity, and often ingenuity, the informal sector in these markets is usually sizeable. As a result, many larger companies find themselves competing with both formal and informal players. This can be tough, given the questionable tax compliance practices, patchy health and safety records, and low cost bases associated with the informal sector. Despite these challenges, however, companies that can find

the right value proposition have seen customers happily pay for the benefit of a safe, consistent product.

Competition from the informal sector is particularly fierce for the large alcohol and tobacco companies. But it is also this competition that gives rise to some of the most exciting opportunities.

INFORMAL HOME BREWS IN AFRICA

SABMiller (SAB), now part of Anheuser-Busch InBev, has a long history on the African continent. With roots stretching back to 1895, it has spent over 100 years competing with traditional or opaque beers in Southern Africa. Opaque beer is typically fermented in small quantities from sorghum or maize. It has been drunk for thousands of years in villages across the continent, and is brewed based on recipes passed down through generations. Drinking opaque beer at social occasions is part of the cultural fabric of rural villages and urban capitals across sub-Saharan Africa.

With the introduction of Chibuku, SAB's opaque beer, the brewer has been able to formalise the mass brewing of traditional beer, tapping into the informal home brew opportunity in 10 countries to date. It has profited from



offering an affordable, safe and consistent alternative to small-scale backyard brewers. By formalising the informal sector, it has also brought these profits into the tax net, which benefits the governments in these countries. In Zimbabwe, one of the first markets to sell Chibuku, opaque beer sales amount to triple the volume of lager beer sales and account for double the profits.

Chibuku broadened SAB's product offering and allowed it to move beyond the clear beer or lager market. Formalising the informal beer market also helped SAB capture a larger share of the total alcohol market. A secondary impact is that Chibuku makes the business more stable and less cyclical. Periods of increased consumer spending see beer drinkers trade up from opaque beer to lager beer, while recessions see down-trading from lager to opaque beer. SAB is able to capture the full range of consumption in both economic environments.

In addition to Zimbabwe, this exciting story is currently playing out in SA, Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Lesotho and Swaziland. The opaque beer opportunity is also part of our investment case for holding the brewers in some of these countries.

BEEDIES IN ASIA

A more nascent opportunity lies in beedies. Beedies are small, hand-rolled cigarettes made of tobacco flakes wrapped in leaves and tied with colourful string. Beedies are prevalent in India and much of Southeast Asia, and are a very low-cost alternative to cigarettes. However, the industry is synonymous with child labour and beedi smoking is considered to be significantly more harmful than cigarettes. While no global cigarette company has found a way to compete with the beedi industry yet, we believe that the formalisation opportunity in Sri Lanka is particularly interesting.

Ceylon Tobacco Company (CTC), a British American Tobacco subsidiary, has a monopoly in Sri Lanka's formal cigarette market. However, this does not tell the full story, as beedies account for 45% of the total tobacco market.

For CTC, the opportunity to produce a beedi-type product will see its addressable market almost double. Machine-rolled beedies will be safer than informal beedies, and cheaper than cigarettes. Entering this market would therefore allow CTC to grow volumes, while customers would be able to consume a less harmful product. As is the case with Chibuku in Africa, the Sri Lankan government also stands to benefit, as any profits from beedi sales would be taxable (which is unlikely to be the case today). Furthermore, applying global health and safety practices to the beedi industry should be positive for lawmakers and should help keep more children in schools.

CTC is currently pursuing the beedi opportunity. If successful, we have no doubt that the technology will be rolled out into other markets. Bangladesh, where beedies account for 40% of the tobacco market, is another prime candidate for formalisation. Even in an industry such as tobacco where volumes are declining, the company that is able to formalise the informal sector can see a return to growth.

As we scour the world's frontier markets looking for investment opportunities, we often come across companies innovatively meeting their customers' needs. As these economies move from frontier to emerging market status, we will no doubt see more examples of this. The governments in these countries stand to benefit. Consumers stand to benefit. And hopefully, as shareholders, we will benefit as well. Now surely that is something to toast to.

As long-term investors, environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations are fully integrated into our investment process and form part of the mosaic for any investment case, in understanding the long-term sustainability of companies and their business worth. When valuing a business, we take ESG factors into account predominantly by adjusting the discount rate applied to the assessment of its normalised earnings. We therefore implicitly build the risks relating to ESG considerations into the ratings of the businesses we analyse. Where we can, we explicitly allow for ESG costs in the modelling of a company's earnings. We do not exclude investments in companies that perform poorly on ESG screens, but we do require greater risk-adjusted upside before investing. In practice, a business with an ambiguous ESG profile will be required to deliver higher returns to justify its inclusion in the portfolio.

Social objectives vary significantly between investors, and ESG issues are often intrinsically fraught with ambiguity. We engage with segregated clients on significant ESG issues to ascertain if we should apply specific screens or exclusions to their portfolios.





HOPE FADES FOR SA GROWTH

HARD-WON GAINS AT RISK

By Marie Antelme

Marie is an economist within the fixed interest investment unit. She joined Coronation in 2014 after working for UBS AG, First South Securities and Credit Suisse First Boston.



In January, I wrote about how a little good news could go a long way to making this year feel quite a lot better than last year. For the first time in a long time, forecasters were revising growth numbers up, not down, and inflation down, not up.

The constraints of 2016 – the drought, skyrocketing inflation, rising interest rates, slowing growth and the ongoing threat of ratings action – were all set to ease. Good rains had produced a large maize crop, and food inflation was slowing already. The SA Reserve Bank's (SARB) monetary policy committee (MPC) signalled that it 'may' be at the end of the hiking cycle, and an improvement in terms of trade helped stabilise the exchange rate and brought the trade balance into surplus. The Budget tabled by former minister of finance Pravin Gordhan was credible, consistent and committed. Better growth and fiscal discipline raised the possibility that negative ratings actions might just be delayed.

And then the president sent that SMS on 27 March.

This is where the good news starts to fade.


The message calling Gordhan home from his offshore roadshow came at a time when the economy was just showing statistical evidence that it was turning the corner. Following the subsequent events – the cabinet reshuffle of key ministerial positions, most notably the replacement of the finance minister and his deputy, followed by the resignation of the Treasury's director-general; the foreign currency ratings downgrade below investment grade, first by S&P and then by Fitch, which downgraded both local and foreign currency ratings; and the currency weakness, equity losses and significantly higher bond yields – the outlook for the economy has clearly changed.

The first evidence was the MPC's communiqué at the end of March. The statement concluded that the SARB 'may' be at the end of the hiking cycle. Without the political uncertainty at the time, the wording of this would have been more dovish, and probably would have opened the door for easing later in the year. This now seems unlikely. While low growth and moderating inflation may have allowed for

a shallow easing cycle into early 2018, the SARB is more likely to hold steady and weather the political volatility.

Hard-won fiscal gains are also at risk. After implementing counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2009, the failure to moderate spending has led to a meaningful deterioration in SA's fiscal position. The deficit has been stuck at around 3.5% to 4% of GDP since 2009, resulting in ballooning debt: from a nadir below 30% of GDP in 2007 to over 50% at the end of 2016. In his second term as finance minister, Gordhan worked hard to maintain a ceiling on spending, and in his past two budgets, he raised revenue through a variety of tax adjustments. His efforts were aimed at regaining some of the lost 'fiscal space' by driving down the pace of debt accumulation, and ultimately lowering the stock of debt relative to GDP. A loss of the current fiscal discipline is likely to see debt continue to accumulate, probably at a faster pace. Rising debt initially limits government's ability to invest in 'good' capacity spending, and ultimately risks that it can no longer meet its financing obligations.

SA MEDIAN CREDIT RATING (1995 - 2015)



Sources: HSBC, National Treasury

Gordhan's fierce commitment to rooting out corruption and improving governance at state-owned enterprises (SOEs),




which continue to cost the state enormous sums through mismanagement, has also been undermined. Already SAA has announced that its realised loss in 2016 was R3.5 billion – double the original estimate. State-owned broadcaster SABC has also reported persistent losses, the last estimate being R400 million. These losses now represent direct capital claims on government, and together with Eskom, Transnet, the SA National Roads Agency and the Road Accident Fund have added to considerable contingent liabilities to the state. Government has extended guarantees totalling R480 billion in the last fiscal year; if utilised, this is currently about 10% of GDP.

Also, the ratings downgrades are not likely to happen in isolation. Moody's has SA on notice for a downgrade too, and will make an announcement soon. Ratings are important – they imply a higher cost of funding for government and corporate debt as the issuers' risk assessment deteriorates. Ratings can have a material, direct impact on capital flows as sentiment deteriorates – especially if the ratings action affects the country's inclusion in investor benchmark indices such as Citi's World Government Bond Index. At this stage, exclusion is not imminent, but it is certainly a lot closer than it was. Government is likely to pay more for its debt, and even before these developments, interest service on the rising stock of government debt is the fastest growing expenditure item in the Budget.

RISK FIRMLY TO THE DOWNSIDE

Despite this, there is still sufficient momentum to suggest this year will, indeed, produce better growth than last year. GDP statistics published for 2016 show that for the year as a whole, the economy grew just 0.3%, from 1.3% in 2015. The latest data, for the fourth quarter of 2016, revealed growth contracted by 0.3% from the previous quarter (after seasonal adjustment), from just 0.4% in the third quarter, but that it gained 0.3% from the same quarter in 2015. The weakness was concentrated in a drawdown of inventories, but household consumption was pretty resilient at 2.2%

SA REAL AND NOMINAL GDP GROWTH




Source: Statistics SA

year on year, supported by ongoing gains in compensation. Unsurprisingly, capital formation remained weak, but at 1.7% year on year was less weak than in previous quarters. Much of the improvement came from the broader public sector – the private sector continues to underinvest. The trade balance registered a surplus and the current account deficit narrowed meaningfully in 2016, to 3.3% of GDP (in the fourth quarter, it reached -1.7%) from -4.3% the year before.

High-frequency data released by March built on small improvements in growth momentum seen in January and February. The Barclays Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) remained elevated at 52.2, from 52.5 and 50.9 in the previous two months. This is a signal of stronger manufacturing output in coming months. New passenger car sales were up 2.1% year on year off a weak base, but on balance the quarter is sequentially the strongest in two years. The crop estimates committee forecasted that SA's total maize harvest could almost double last year's production (14.3 million tonnes, compared to 7.8 million tonnes in 2015/2016). This should give a meaningful boost to growth from agriculture, and will also help lower prices of cereals and feed, curbing food inflation.

SA INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY



Sources: Barclays, Statistics SA

While tax increases announced in the Budget will offset some of the positive impact of lower inflation on household spending, cooling prices should help raise the real incomes of households, especially the poor. CPI inflation, which reached 6.7% year on year in December, moderated to 6.3% by February despite some hefty increases in retail fuel prices earlier this year.

Relative to a year ago, food inflation has been sticky, and remains high at 10% year on year. But this is already off the peak of 12% reached in October last year, and the high base, coupled with the improved outlook for maize prices (as a cereal, and as feed), should also contribute to easing retail prices. The lagging impact of relative strength in the exchange rate following the sell-off in December 2015



(before the most recent decline) should continue to provide positive support for lower inflation in coming months.

SA EXCHANGE RATES (DECEMBER 2011 = 100)



Source: Reuters Datastream

At this stage, we do not think the MPC will cut interest rates amid high political uncertainty and persistent risks to the currency. That said, if inflation falls meaningfully, the outlook for 2018 improves from the SARB's 5.4% forecast and growth fears are realised, it is not inconceivable that rates could fall modestly.

DAMAGE DONE?

The impact of the political changes of the past weeks may only really transpire in many years to come as the slow bleeding of resources and loss of skills and investment feed through. Then again, the fallout may also hit quickly, as fiscal losses at SOEs, government departments and state-owned corporations bubble to the surface, revealing the extent of mismanagement, corruption and degradation that took root years ago, but now emerge as the structures holding

SA INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES



Sources: Reuters, Statistics SA, Coronation

everything together collapse. It is possible too that a new narrative emerges from within the ruling party that recommits itself to sustainable, responsible economic policies.

Growth remains the single most important ingredient in fiscal sustainability, in poverty eradication, and in generating and supporting institutions that protect the vulnerable. For an economy to grow, it needs to create jobs, invest in capacity and improve productivity. Job creation and investment only happen when households and businesses are confident about the prospects of the economy. This is not just about big companies, which in the case of SA have been offshoring operations for years, but also about the 'mom-and-pop' outfits that provide small services or speciality manufacturing. It is about the young people who start businesses with friends and invest in their communities. When these are supported, the additional funding, especially the foreign funding that fills the gap between what SA saves and what it consumes (the current account), can come. Without it, everything is much, much harder.





BOND OUTLOOK

A CAUTIOUS OUTLOOK IN POLITICALLY UNCERTAIN TIMES

By Nishan Maharaj

Nishan is head of Coronation's fixed interest investment unit. He joined the business in 2012 and has 14 years' experience in the investment industry.



"Life isn't about waiting for the storm to pass ... It's about learning to dance in the rain." - Vivian Greene

SA started 2017 with such promise and exuberance, as underlying drivers of the local economy entered a cyclical upswing amid what seemed to be a much calmer and supportive political landscape. In addition, the global backdrop had become (and remains) supportive of emerging markets, with the adherence of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) to a gradual path of rate normalisation, continued monetary policy accommodation on the European continent and a more upbeat overall growth outlook, driven primarily by cyclical upswings in China and the US.

The SA 10-year benchmark bond traded below 9% for most of the quarter (supported by a rally in the rand to below R12.50/\$), grinding steadily towards a low point of 8.25%. Unfortunately, this rally was short lived as political events in the last week of March caused major reversals in the rand, local bond yields and sentiment towards SA.

The All Bond Index (ALBI) returned 0.4% in March, 2.5% for the first quarter of 2017 and 11% over the last 12 months. The 12-year and longer range of the bond curve was the biggest contributor to this performance, due to its greater than 60% weighting in the index. Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) have continued to perform poorly, returning -2.15% in March, -0.5% for the quarter and 3.4% over the last 12 months. This was due to very high initial levels of implied breakeven inflation (6.5% to 7%), which necessitated a move higher in real yields as the 12-month to 18-month inflation average and profile moved considerably lower (towards 5%). ILBs now trade at approximate real yields of 2.3%, which are much cheaper than previous levels, and although they do not scream value, they warrant consideration for inclusion in a bond portfolio.

Over the last two years, SA assets have been on a roller coaster ride, with local headline news adding to the volatility of asset prices. Markets have the ability to administer lessons that every investor, regardless of experience or expertise, should pay close attention to. Over the recent past, two

lessons in particular have stood out and echoed the key principles of Coronation's investment philosophy. Firstly and most importantly, valuation is the only true objective guide one has when it comes to investing. Secondly, trying to forecast macro events is a job best left to those highly intelligent and talented individuals who write comic books that turn into blockbusters.

The events of 9 December 2015 (Nenegate) took both markets and the country by surprise. Ever since, all eyes have been on the machinations and actions of the reformist camp in their battle against the tenderpreneurs. An astute and logical individual following these developments would have naturally drawn the conclusion that there had been a very large reduction in the ability of the tenderpreneurs to launch an attack against the reformists. More importantly, the progression of events over the last 15 months had suggested that, if the attack were to materialise, it would spell an almost immediate end to the tenderpreneurship faction.

The cabinet reshuffle at end-March and the events that followed unfortunately suggest the direct opposite to any such conclusion. This is a clear illustration of how difficult it is to attempt to predict macropolitical events – and more importantly, how basing investment decisions on expectations around certain key outcomes is tantamount to investment suicide (a lesson further reiterated by Brexit and the surprise election of Donald Trump as US president last year).

The margin of error in forecasting can be very large, which means that when you are making a decision on whether to buy or sell an asset (in this case, SA government bonds), you have to ensure that the price you pay for that asset provides a sufficient margin of safety against forecasting error and short-term volatility. In the same breath, however, you cannot purely rely on a single measure of value to determine the attractiveness of an asset. Rather, you must utilise a few methods to validate a cheap valuation signal.

The simplest way to determine the fair value of an SA 10-year government bond is to construct it as a function of global



risk-free rates, inflation differentials and a country-specific risk premium:

FAIR VALUE DETERMINATION: SA 10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND

Global risk-free rate (US 10-year bond)	2.50%
US expected 10-year inflation	(2.00%)
SA expected 10-year inflation	6.00%
SA-specific risk premium	2.41%
SA 10-year fair value estimate	8.91%

Source: Coronation analysis (as at 7 April 2017)

We have applied a level of conservatism to all the variables listed above, especially to SA inflation expectations, where 6% is the top end of the inflation band and significantly above our estimates of average inflation over the next two years (5.35%). However, SA's risk premium is the most questionable variable. In the case of further political interference and policy inaction, is it representative of a sufficient margin of safety?

As illustrated in the graph below, SA's sovereign spread has not changed significantly post the recent credit rating downgrades from Standard & Poor's (S&P) and Fitch, as it was already pricing in subinvestment grade status.

SUBINVESTMENT GRADE HAS BEEN PRICED IN

Credit default swap spread vs Moody's sovereign credit rating



Source: Bloomberg

However, the more important question is how distressed the sovereign spread may get in the event of significant stress. The following graph shows the spread between SA's sovereign spread and a grouping of BBB-rated countries (countries with BBB+, BBB and BBB- ratings), to provide more context on the assumptions used in our calculation in the table above (currently 80 basis points [bps]). Two key stress areas to take note of are the period in December 2015 (Nenegate; spread of 140 bps) and the period before 2000, when S&P and Fitch had upgraded SA to investment-grade status (the average spread during this period was 180 bps).

SA'S SOVEREIGN SPREAD VS BBB-RATED COUNTRIES



Source: Bloomberg

This suggests it is reasonable to expect that the current sovereign spread would need to reprice between 60 bps and 100 bps higher if the economy were to experience significantly more stress – that is, move further away from the underlying fundamentals of an investment-grade economy. Plugging in a sovereign spread that is 60 bps to 100 bps wider suggests a fair value of SA government bonds of 9.5% to 9.9%, significantly above the current level of 9%.

In the following two valuation metrics, we compare current yield levels to levels experienced during Nenegate, both from a real yield perspective and as a spread to US 10-year bonds, as this is the closest episode in our history that bears semblance to the current political landscape. SA inflation has averaged 5.8% since the start of inflation targeting in the early 2000s, and we use this as an assumption to strip out the implied 10-year real interest rate. The current level


SA 10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND VS US 10-YEAR BOND



Source: Bloomberg



SA IMPLIED 10-YEAR REAL INTEREST RATE



Source: Bloomberg

of 3% does not compare favourably to the 3.75% average between December 2015 and February 2016. In addition, when calculating the spread between current SA 10-year government bond levels and US 10-year bond levels over the same period, the current level of 670 bps is much lower than the range of between 740 bps and 750 bps reached during the Nenegate period. On both these measures, the fair yield on the SA 10-year government bond should be around 9.7% to 9.8% given the current backdrop – 70 bps to 80 bps higher than current levels.


ILBs are an important consideration in any fixed-income portfolio, as they provide an element of protection if yields sell off due to deteriorating inflation expectations. This is because their principal amount is scaled according to the inflation rate, and therefore coupon payments are too.

There are a few key considerations when it comes to valuing ILBs:

- the current pricing of inflation expectations, and how the total return expectation compares to other asset classes;
- the outright level of real yields compared to expectations and history; and
- consideration of greater capital risk, given the higher modified duration of these instruments.

The graph below illustrates implied inflation expectations as represented by the difference between SA government nominal bonds and ILBs. It suggests that inflation expectations are still quite a bit higher than the top end of the inflation targeting band, which is very hopeful considering that inflation has only averaged 5.8% since the start of inflation targeting. If you hold an ILB maturing in 2025 (currently yielding 2.35% till maturity), inflation would need to average 6.4% over the next eight years for the ILB's total return to exceed that of a nominal bond of the same maturity (9%). Considering that the nominal bond carries a modified duration of six (a 6% capital loss in the event of a 100 bps move higher in nominal loss in the event of a 100 bps move higher in real yields), the

NOMINAL BONDS VS INFLATION-LINKED BONDS



2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051

Sources: Coronation and Bloomberg



nominal bond seems to be the more attractive asset on a risk-adjusted basis, but only just. Considering that the real policy rate in SA has never sustainably been above 2.5%, a case can be made for a small holding of ILBs within a portfolio to protect against inflation being unanchored above 6% if the backdrop deteriorates further and the rand is put under greater pressure. However, one must be cognisant of symmetric probabilities in terms of political outcomes.

The current local backdrop remains challenging. Despite cyclical factors turning supportive of the local economy, the political landscape has once again soured, bringing into question the ability of policymakers to make the hard decisions necessary to implement much-needed structural reforms. In addition, ratings agencies have already started to move SA down a path into subinvestment grade from both a local and foreign currency perspective, further souring sentiment towards SA assets. SA's inclusion in the Citi World Government Bond Index relies on our local currency debt being rated as investment grade by both Moody's and S&P. S&P currently has SA one notch above investment grade, while in the next month it is very likely that Moody's will take a similar position. The continuation of the current status quo will inevitably lead to further downgrades of SA's key metrics. More specifically, growth will come under severe pressure as optimism - and hence investment into the economy - will continue to slow. A downgrade to subinvestment grade on our local currency rating would trigger mandated selling of SA government bonds to the tune of between R100 billion and R120 billion. That would be in addition to natural government issuance of R190 billion - R290 billion to R310 billion of net selling in a single calendar year!

Increased foreign participation in the local market has limited the sell-off in the SA government bond market, as foreign participants have purchased almost R25 billion worth of SA government bonds year to date (the majority in the week following the cabinet reshuffle). The foreign reaction has been based on the supportive global backdrop, and hope of a turnaround based on the recent experience in Brazil (following the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff as president and the consequent rally in Brazilian assets).

As a South African, I remain hopeful that the turnaround in SA will be as quick and energetic as in Brazil, but realistically one has to be honest in the assessment of the current context and circumstances in SA.

Firstly, the Brazilian government was a coalition government made up of equally strong parties that broke up their alliance in retaliation against the president's wrongful actions. Secondly, unemployment in Brazil more than doubled in a very short period (from under 5% to 10%), which caused mass protest and public outcry, further intensifying calls for the president to step down. In addition, foreign ownership of the local debt market in Brazil was under 15%, given the string of taxes that had been implemented previously to limit hot money flows into the country, and government bonds were trading at double-digit yields of 13% to 14% (implied real yields of more than 6%). From start to end, the Brazilian real weakened almost 40%, and bonds sold off 300 bps to 400 bps in the lead-up to the final impeachment.

SA has a one-party government, an unemployment rate that is already in double digits but has not deteriorated further significantly, foreign local debt ownership of already close to 40% and local debt that still trades in single digits. Therefore, key differences exist that will cause the turnaround process to stretch on for a bit longer – meaning that valuations, although cheaper now, could get a whole lot cheaper.

The current environment warrants a certain degree of caution when assessing the valuation of SA government bonds. Despite the cyclical upswing that the economy is undergoing and the supportive global environment, political uncertainty could derail an already precariously fragile local recovery. In addition, current valuations of SA government bonds, although closer to fair value, are still some way off from offering a sufficient margin of safety in their reflected yields, especially if a downgrade of the local currency debt rating becomes more of a concern.

We are therefore more cautious in our approach to SA government bonds, and would need to see a further widening from the current levels of 9% to above 9.5% before committing in a meaningful way to the asset class.





SA PORTFOLIO UPDATE

PERFORMANCE OF OUR SA INVESTMENT STRATEGIES

Our portfolios have emerged well from an extremely turbulent start to the year in SA.

The FTSE/JSE All Share Index's return of 3.8% for the first quarter (2.5% for the rolling 12-month period) belies the sharp sell-off in locally focused assets following the shock cabinet reshuffle at the end of March. Domestic investors have also seen a currency shock and a surge in government bond yields in recent weeks in reaction to the political uncertainty.

We do expect the domestic situation to deteriorate further, so we are inclined to favour businesses operating outside of SA, and will require a greater margin of safety for buying purely domestic businesses. We do not believe that the decline in pure domestic stocks compensates investors for the deterioration in the macroeconomic environment and enhanced risk.

In aggregate, we think our portfolios are well positioned with an overweight position in rand hedge equities and limited exposure to domestic government bonds.

SPECIALIST EQUITY STRATEGIES

	Launch date	1 year	5 years	Since inception*
Houseview Equity	Oct 93	4.89%	14.37%	17.67%
Benchmark		2.70%	12.74%	14.81%
Aggressive Equity	Jan 04	9.71%	12.77%	18.20%
Benchmark		2.70%	12.74%	15.29%

*Annualised

Both our specialist equity strategies have delivered a strong performance in a volatile environment. Rand hedge holdings, which we believe offer compelling stock-specific fundamentals, remain the cornerstone of these strategies.

Our rand hedge industrial holdings, such as Naspers, British American Tobacco and Mondi (which in particular continues to deliver a steady earnings growth profile and good cash generation), have had a solid start to the year, notwithstanding the rand strength. Despite the political events, the rand ended the quarter 2.1% stronger (up 9.3% over the rolling 12 months). Although the rand has weakened since quarter-end, we believe it is still pricing in a relatively optimistic political and economic outcome and believe that the risks are skewed to the downside.

The strategies have increased their exposure to MTN during the quarter. The share has halved from its peak a few years ago and sentiment is currently very negative. Although the risks inherent in regions like Nigeria and Iran are high, we believe that the potential upside in the stock justifies our current weighting. (A detailed investment case of MTN can be found on page 18.)

Prices in the resource sector spiked towards quarter-end due to the earnings protection they offer as a result of the weaker rand. Stock picks that performed well include Northam Platinum (up 27%), Exxaro (up 32%) and Glencore (up 13%). Although we have taken profits in some of our resource holdings, we retain a healthy weighting in the sector. The platinum sector remains an interesting one. Although the equities have recovered strongly off their lows, they remain depressed. A stock like Impala trades 87% off its peak at the top of the commodity market in 2008. It trades at a 50% discount to its book value and only breaks even at current platinum group metals (PGM) prices. PGM markets are in deficit and mine supply is likely to continue to reflect the mining companies' underinvestment over the last 10 years. The industry cannot survive at current prices. We think there is significant optionality, should prices increase to a level sufficient to keep platinum miners in business. Northam is our key pick in the sector. It is a lowcost producer with less labour-intensive operations than its peers. A strong balance sheet and significant optionality in its ore bodies support its ability to grow relatively quickly, should the cycle turn.

Financials underperformed for the quarter as the market priced in the ramifications of rising capital costs and a more challenged domestic economy. Reliance on external funding and heavily geared balance sheets make banks



extremely vulnerable to shocks of this nature. We have not yet considered taking advantage of the lower prices in the sector as we believe the risks are skewed to the downside, given the market's very benign reaction to recent developments.

In steep contrast to the beginning of 2016, we came into this year cautiously optimistic about SA. Domestic-focused counters certainly looked to have a brighter outlook and stood to benefit from falling inflation and the end of rising interest rates. While these macro variables remain largely unchanged, the recent political developments have given us reason to pause and rethink this outlook. The political change in direction has once again put us in an environment of deep uncertainty.

Our disciplined and long-term investment philosophy, and the advantage it typically provides in volatile periods, remains our anchor in these uncertain times.

BALANCED STRATEGIES

	Launch date		5 years	Since inception*
Global Houseview	Oct 93	5.68%	14.39%	16.54%
Peer median		4.96%	12.85%	15.16%
Managed	May 96	8.50%	14.95%	16.99%
Peer median		4.96%	12.85%	14.01%

*Annualised

Our balanced strategies, Global Houseview and Managed, continued to outperform over meaningful periods.

Despite great uncertainty locally and globally, these strategies have a high allocation to risk assets (equity and listed property). This is because we believe the biggest risk lies in inflation eroding real capital values over time. In our view, equity and property still offer the best risk/return payoff profile.

Our global equity position, which had a higher allocation to other emerging markets, has delivered a strong outperformance. Emerging markets sustained their rally into the new year, after a strong 2016. Our overall allocation to offshore assets is sitting close to its maximum, as we are very concerned about the risks that recent political change present to all stakeholders in the SA economy.

In our domestic exposure, our allocation to resource shares has contributed to performance. Our underweight position in companies that are sensitive to domestic interest rates and the local economy has also been beneficial, as these companies have been hit hard following the recent replacement of the finance minister.

Our property allocation includes domestic SA property holdings, UK property stocks listed on the JSE and some

high-quality domestic counters. We consider UK-listed property an exciting opportunity for the patient investor. Our largest holding is Intu, a portfolio of high-quality shopping centres. We expect the local property sector to show mid-single-digit growth in distributions over the medium term. Reasonable distribution growth, combined with an attractive initial yield (typically in the 8% to 10% region), should result in an attractive holding period return.

We have been very underweight sovereign debt for some time, and have maintained this position. Global bond markets remain very expensive due to central bank buying strategies, and the local market does not fully price the risk of greater budget deficits as economic growth weakens and potential political demands on the Treasury increase.

The world remains as uncertain as ever. With the elections in France, a volatile US government and rising US interest rates, we remain alert to the opportunities that volatility may present to the long-term investor.

ABSOLUTE RETURN STRATEGIES

	Launch date	1 year	5 years	Since inception*
Domestic Absolute	Apr 02	7.71%	9.02%	15.40%
СЫ		6.35%	5.73%	5.98%
Inflation Plus	Oct 09	7.94%	10.10%	11.14%
СЫ		6.35%	5.73%	5.44%
Global Absolute	Aug 99	7.43%	11.82%	16.08%
СРІ		6.35%	5.73%	6.24%

*Annualised

Despite the volatility towards the end of the quarter, the strategies performed well during this period and over the past year.

Given the well-diversified multi-asset nature of the strategies, we construct the portfolios to withstand unforeseen events. In the case of SA, the rand invariably acts as the biggest shock absorber and owning a high proportion of domestically listed companies that derive the bulk of their earnings from outside the country has again proven to be a prudent approach.

Global stock markets were generally strong, driven by expectations of positive policy changes by the Trump administration (such as lowering corporate taxes). However, the markets have in our view ignored the risks of tensions in the global economy as president Trump advocates protectionism through his 'America First' approach. We consequently decided to reduce our exposure to global risk assets somewhat by lightening both our developed and emerging market equity holdings.



Still, our absolute return strategies continue to hold close to the maximum allowable limit to global assets.

The volatility in the bond market once again gave us the opportunity to trade domestic government bonds profitably. We ended up being net sellers during the quarter, with our average sell level being 8.35%, while our average buy level was 8.75%. We continue to prefer equities and property, which represent the larger part of the portfolios.

We have navigated uncertain periods before by steadfastly focusing on the tenets of our long-term, valuation-driven investment philosophy and, once again, we have seen it pay off in the most recent performance of our portfolios.

All our positions are based on sound long-term investment fundamentals and supported by robust valuations. During times of unsettling political developments, this considered approach should provide some comfort.



INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

OPERATING IN UNUSUAL TIMES

By Tony Gibson

Tony is a founder member of Coronation and a former CIO. He established Coronation's international business in the mid-1990s, and has managed the Global Equity Fund of Funds Strategy since inception.



STRONG MARKET PERFORMANCE

All in all, the first quarter of 2017 was another good one for global asset performance. Although weakness in the US dollar somewhat flattered returns, almost every asset class delivered a positive total return - with the exception of certain commodities. Gold reversed its position as the worst-performing asset class of the fourth quarter of 2016 to end at the top of the performance tables in the first quarter of 2017, rising 8.4%. Global equities also did well, rising 6.9% and thereby continuing to outperform bonds (as has been the case since the global low point in yields seen around the time of the Brexit vote). The best returns came from the global technology sector, which rose 12%. To put this in perspective, it is worth noting that the top four megacaps of the sector (Apple, Alphabet, Amazon and Facebook) now have a combined market capitalisation twice that of the French CAC 40 Index. Energy was the only sector not to deliver positive performance, falling 5% on the back of lower oil prices.

In the bond and credit markets, returns largely appear to have followed a pattern commensurate with asset risk. Therefore, the lower the credit rating, the better the return. This is illustrated by the fact that despite the interest rate hike by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) in March, emerging market debt (in local currency) performed very strongly, producing a 6.4% total return. Additionally, returns were boosted by strength in emerging market currencies, with the Mexican peso, Russian rouble and Korean won rising

8% to 10% against the US dollar. Interestingly, despite a more hawkish Fed, US Treasury yields moved lower over the quarter, albeit marginally. In the currency market, the clear trend during the quarter was that investors' long-standing preference for the US dollar has declined, with the currency underperforming every other major currency during the quarter. The Australian dollar (+6%) and Japanese yen (+5%) were the standout performers among developed market currencies.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Looking at economic statistics, global nominal GDP appears to be on track to record its second consecutive 6% annualised quarterly gain in the first quarter of 2017. This will represent a sharp acceleration from the 4.5% annualised growth rate over the previous two years. Supporting this assertion is the fact that manufacturing output growth is accelerating to a pace of 4.6% for the quarter, suggesting a significant boost from a positive turn in the inventory cycle. The strength in manufacturing activity appears to have been broad based, and has prompted economists to revise their GDP forecasts – particularly for western Europe and Asia.

As we already know, the US economy grew more modestly during the fourth quarter of 2016. That said, the US is also starting to experience the global pick-up in manufacturing (output is tracking a 3.8% annualised rise this quarter) and sentiment is improving. It seems probable that US economic growth is poised to bounce back to a level of around 3% as



the year progresses, fuelling a faster gain in overall global GDP for the next couple of quarters.

Looking at Europe, growth dynamics in the region continue to improve: the European Commission's Economic Sentiment Indicator is at a six-year high, the German Ifo Business Climate Index is improving and the European labour market is tightening. Again, economists are steadily revising their 2017 growth outlook for the region upwards. Given the pace of labour market tightening, it was somewhat unexpected that core inflation in March surprised significantly to the downside. At an annual rate of 0.7%, core inflation is now back at the low end of an already low four-year range. However, beyond this year, changing labour market dynamics should begin to put upward pressure on prices. While core inflation may only rise to 1.4% (year on year) by the end of 2018, the upward momentum in both growth and inflation should be sufficient to trigger quantitative easing tapering early next year. That said, the first rate hike from the European Central Bank (ECB) will most likely not come until late 2018. This forecast is reinforced by recent ECB comments.

ALL EYES ON THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

Looking towards the medium term, it should be noted that the US Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 Index had been moving broadly sideways for nearly two years during the build-up to the 2016 US election. This period of muted performance coincided with the Fed beginning to normalise policy, during a time in which the economy was mired in a stop-go pattern of growth. Additionally, corporate earnings actually declined (mostly because of reported earnings declines from companies in the energy sector) during 2016. Then along came Donald Trump and the equity market changed tack, as it wholeheartedly embraced his reflation argument. The strongly bullish line of argument was that growth would be energised by a combination of deregulation, tax cuts and infrastructure spending.

Thus far, little that is either elegant or convincing has been forthcoming from the Trump administration. Investors have increasingly begun to wonder whether the recent healthcare reform failure is telling of how Trump's other main policy proposals may play out. It has also raised questions about whether his policies will be sufficient to generate a sustained increase in the growth rate of the US economy. A worry is that tax reform legislation will be just as hard to achieve following the healthcare reform failure. Additionally, financial deregulation could face significant opposition and infrastructure spending plans may have a more muted impact on the economy than many believe, as it appears these plans are based on tax credits that will rely on private sector investment. Either way, whether positive or negative on the Trump administration, the events of recent weeks have to cast doubt on just how successful Trump will be in boosting the US economy.

Certainly, after the strong gains following Trump's election, investors are more cautious that the healthcare debacle will have a negative impact on sentiment in the US. The question is essentially whether survey data were 'leading' actual economic data or simply getting carried away. The most recent US Purchasing Managers' Index release for February disappointed. That said, the services sector remains strong.

GRADUAL NORMALISATION

Taking a longer-term perspective, although fears of an unstoppable deflationary global contraction have reduced in recent months, expectations for a prolonged disinflationary environment are still built into developed world financial markets. The multi-year rationalisation, and acceptance, of negative real returns on short- and medium-term debt is fed by the self-reinforcing effect of momentum investing. This has distorted borrowing and investing patterns, and should not be seen as sustainable by any rational investor. As a reminder, and to offer perspective, US 10-year Treasury yields fell from the early 1980s to a low of just over 1.4% in mid-2012, and back to that low again in mid-2016. During the time before these already low yields were exaggerated by Fed bond buying, 10-year yields traded in a range between 4% and 5% from mid-2002 through to mid-2008.

Over the coming two to three years, as the Fed continues to raise short-term borrowing rates, it will also begin to retire (rather than reinvest) maturing Treasuries in its portfolio. Without this bond demand distortion (which has been in force since 2009), 10-year yields should continue to 'normalise' and slowly rise back to and above 3%. During this period, bondholders will most likely question the scenario again and might believe that tepid global growth - combined with the glut of global savings, continued bond buying by the ECB and the Bank of Japan, and (yet more) political gridlock in the US - will offset the reduction in Fed bond buying. This (bond-bull) argument therefore believes that further raising the federal funds rate would merely flatten the yield curve, slow the modest domestic recovery and force the Fed to pause - or even loosen again later next year or in 2019. We believe that this is bond-bull rationalisation rather than sound logic.

While prices of basic materials have risen significantly from depressed levels a year ago, the price of gold has remained relatively flat in US dollar terms. To give some context, year-on-year prices of natural gas, crude oil and copper are up by 69%, 34% and 21% respectively. By comparison, the price of gold rose by just 7% over this period. While the price behaviour of gold implies limited immediate inflationary price pressure, the year-on-year increase in the price of oil has triggered a near-term inflationary effect that will move through the supply chain during the course of 2017. Despite this, it is unlikely that the rise in the price of oil will materially suppress consumer spending power in the US, since most of the jump resulted from the over-sold conditions prevailing



a year ago. More important is whether sustained higher energy prices later this year might trigger a second round of inflationary effects, which would lead to expectations of higher wage and consumer prices into 2018.

CHANGE IS COMING

It is our opinion that during the next two years, the outlook points to a modest upturn in global economic activity, resulting in a synchronised period of global growth. This will be led by the US and will be supported by continued momentum from China and India. In China, it appears that to protect its consolidation of power, China's ruling elite needs to support the momentum of growth this year. This in turn should support a further rise in base metal prices. As mentioned, the recent cyclical upturn in commodity prices should add to input price pressure over the next 12 to 18 months. Worryingly, over the longer term it appears likely that the global economic growth rate is set to slow and increasingly diverge between regions.

In examining likely future trends, investors need to be reminded that momentum investing (whether on a macro or share selection level) becomes self-fulfilling. In the late 1970s, inflationary expectations shaped group think, while by the late 1980s, it was Japan's export-driven economic boom. A decade later, the collective focus had shifted to a US-led, tech-driven investment boom. By 2007, the masses of momentum investing were seduced by expectations of a super-long-term, China-driven commodity super cycle. The subsequent collapse, caused by the leverage-driven risk peak in 2008, led the next wave of consensus toward deflationary expectations. This saw the rationalisation of negative real interest rates and a critical mass of investors assuming chronic slow growth, a global savings surplus and a glut of production capacity. Distilled into one line, the belief was that interest rates would remain lower for longer for many years into the future.

All we can state with reasonable certainty is that looking ahead over the next 10 years, the environment that will shape the late 2020s is likely to be far different from the influences that shaped the critical mass of consensus thinking that exists today. We believe that the world will most likely be moving from the current period (which encourages excess savings and is characterised by lower debt yields) towards a period of demographic divergence, during which modest growth in the US will be insufficient to compensate for the ongoing contraction in most of Europe and North Asia. The worry is that rapidly ageing populations, and the resultant negative effect on economic growth, will drain savings and set in motion a process leading towards higher capital costs and reflation. As mentioned above, in each of the past five decades, such a transition and the resulting shift in the direction of momentum investing will be dramatic. At Coronation, we know well that during the early stages of such a macro change, inertia towards recognising the trend can frustrate premature contrarian investments.

Put another way, it may well take another two to three years before rising nominal interest rates produce a real rate of return (after inflation) for passive investors. However, it is our belief that the era of disinflation that led to negative real interest rates is over. It is the interference of central banks (by buying public sector debt) that is preventing markets from pricing capital, and thereby distorting risk and financial asset allocation. Without this temporary and artificial support, the transformation of the global economy and financial system would have already become more apparent.

Therefore, while near-term conditions favour a period of growth in 2017 that is likely to last into 2019, we foresee this fading quickly in the 2020s as the economic, financial and political environment will begin to deteriorate across most of Europe and North Asia. Collectively, the common thread is likely to be a steady contraction in the global pool of mobile capital. This will result in the cost of capital becoming increasingly unaffordable for those countries failing to manage their economies in a prudent and productive manner. SA will be particularly vulnerable to this trend.

With regard to global equity markets, the valuation of the US market is the benchmark from which investors generally take guidance. There is little doubt that US equities appear overpriced – especially when measured against long-term averages. Additionally, a recent survey undertaken by Bank of America indicates that over 80% of participants believed that the US equity market looks expensive. A measure that is often turned to when seeking valuation guidance is the cyclically adjusted Shiller Index. This index is the S&P 500 price-to-earnings ratio based on average earnings over the past 10 years. This index is now well above the very long-term average of 16.7 times – currently standing at 29.7 times.

While this undoubtedly high valuation calls for caution, it is worth pointing out that this has been the case for a number of years in the severe post-2008 equity bear market. Additionally, statistical studies have shown that historically, the Shiller Index has only explained around 10% of market movements over any subsequent five-year period. As we well know, we operate in very unusual times at present, when assessed in terms of ease of forecasting. Many fundamental demographic and social changes are currently unfolding, which make forecasting problematic. It is a time during which investors who draw on their ability to apply much-needed perspective and calm will navigate the uncertainty successfully.





CORONATION HOUSEVIEW EQUITY

SUPERIOR, CONSISTENT RETURNS OVER THE LONG TERM

INCEPTION DATE
October 1993
PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

Karl Leinberger, Sarah-Jane Alexander and Adrian Zetler. Karl has managed the Coronation Houseview Equity Strategy since 2005. Sarah-Jane joined Coronation in 2008 and manages assets within the strategy. Adrian is co-manager and joined Coronation in 2009.

OVERVIEW

Coronation Houseview Equity is our flagship specialist SA equity strategy. Launched in 1993, it boasts a compelling track record of almost 24 years of material outperformance of the SA equity market. Having recently been re-opened to new investors after a five-year closure (read more in the article on page 14), we are pleased that this offers more of our institutional clients the opportunity to share in this strong performance.

MANDATE

Coronation Houseview Equity represents our best investment view for an equity mandate. The portfolio is constructed on a clean-slate basis with no reference to a benchmark. As such, we seek to identify the most compelling risk-adjusted returns in the market with the aim of outperforming the equity market over meaningful periods (defined as at least five years). Our aim is to replicate the outperformance of the market that this strategy has achieved historically.

PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION

Coronation is a long-term, valuation-driven investment house. Our aim is to identify mispriced assets trading at discounts to their long-term underlying value (fair value) through extensive proprietary research. Coronation Houseview Equity comprises the strongest conviction ideas from our research process – and therefore our view of the most undervalued listed shares in SA, given our long investment horizon.

We do not define risk as volatility, tracking error or divergence from a benchmark but rather as the probability of a permanent loss of capital. Across all of our mandates, we consistently aim to construct robust, antifragile strategies that are sufficiently diversified across our highest conviction investment ideas. We believe that a diversified portfolio of undervalued assets is the best protection an investor has in an uncertain world.

COMPELLING TRACK RECORD

Coronation Houseview Equity has delivered a return of 17.7% per annum since inception almost a quarter of a century ago, outperforming its benchmark by 2.9% per annum during this time. This track record has been produced during various market cycles and periods of unprecedented macro volatility.

GROWTH OF R100 000 INVESTED SINCE INCEPTION




Source: Coronation

A defining feature is the consistency and persistency of the long-term alpha produced, unusual by local and global standards. We believe this is the result of a disciplined focus on investing only in businesses that are trading at a discount to our assessment of their real long-term value.







INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO UPDATE

CORONATION GLOBAL EQUITY FUND OF FUNDS

	Launch date	1 year	3 years	5 years	Since inception
Fund	1 Jul 00	17.18%	5.50%	10.50%	6.25%
Benchmark		15.04%	5.95%	9.89%	4.23%

Annualised, quoted in USD

The fund advanced 7.3% against the benchmark return of 6.9% over the past quarter. This brings its rolling 12-month performance to 17.2% against the 15% returned by the MSCI All Country World Index.

The first quarter of 2017 was another good one for global asset returns, specifically equities. Emerging markets were particularly strong, supported by a declining US dollar. Developed markets also delivered healthy returns. Equity markets in the US continued to benefit from the Trump reflation trade early on in the quarter. However, president Trump's failure to enact the Obamacare replacement bill saw markets ease during March over concerns about his ability to move forward on infrastructure and tax reform. Economists are, however, raising their growth forecasts for western Europe and Asia, and with a probable return to growth of around 3% in the US, markets had a lot to be optimistic about.

The Pacific ex-Japan was the best performing region by a large margin, rising 11.8% (in US dollar terms). The weakest return came from North America, which rose 6%. Japan and Europe returned 7% and 7.6% respectively (both in US dollar terms). Emerging markets (up 11.5%) strongly outperformed developed markets (up 6.4%) in US dollar terms. The regional positioning had a small negative impact on the fund's performance.

Among the global sectors, information technology (+9.3%), healthcare (+7.8%) and consumer staples (+5.9%) generated the best returns. The worst performing sectors were energy (-5.6%), telecoms (+0.2%) and utilities (+4.4%). On a look-through basis, the fund's sector positioning had a positive impact on performance, principally its overweight position

in information technology and underweight positions in energy, telecommunications and financials. Low exposure to healthcare had a small negative impact.

Egerton Capital returned 10% over the quarter and, given its weighting in the fund, made the largest contribution to performance over the period. Egerton's performance benefited from its holdings in Tencent (+17.4%), Charter Communications (+13.7%), Airbus Group SE (+13.5%), Facebook (+23.5%) and S&P Global (+22%). The underlying manager also saw excellent returns from many of its holdings, with only a handful of detractors over the quarter.

Despite underperforming its own benchmark during the quarter, Coronation Global Emerging Markets made a strong contribution to the fund's performance. Positions in Naspers (+14.9%), JD.com (+22.3%) and Heineken (+12%) were among the key contributors, while Magnit (-13.5%) and Tata Motors (-1.2%) detracted slightly from performance.

Conatus Capital Management LP returned 8.3% for the quarter and therefore also generated positive alpha for the fund over the period. Its top performing holdings include Adidas (+18.7%), PTC Inc. (+13.6%), Sony Corporation (+15.3%) and Activision Blizzard Inc. (+38.9%). Many of the manager's middleweight stocks also performed quite well.

Positive contributions also came from Maverick Capital's long-only strategy and Viking Global. Both underlying managers comfortably outperformed the fund's benchmark. Maverick benefited from its exposure to the IT sector, but its position in Sabre Corporation disappointed with a decline of 14.5% over the quarter. Viking, in turn, benefited from positions in Adidas, Facebook, JD.com and Netflix.

Detractors to performance over the period include Eminence, which marginally underperformed the index. The manager's top positions – Autodesk (+16.8%) and Lennar Corp (+19.3%) – delivered strong returns over the quarter, but a number of its smaller positions were a drag on performance. These include AutoNation (-13.1%) and MicroStrategy (-4.9%). Lansdowne Developed Markets also detracted somewhat





from performance in this short period as its top positions moved in line with the market, thereby allowing the few stocks that did decline to have a far greater impact on overall performance.

The medium-term outlook points towards a modest upturn in global economic activity, led by the US and supported by continued momentum from China and India. Fears of a self-feeding disinflationary environment have also greatly receded. This should be supportive of base metals which, after the recent upswing in commodity prices may add to input price pressure.

However, there are a number of uncertainties that could vex markets in the short term, such as Trump's strategy on taxation and global trade as well as the imminent Brexit negotiations. US equities are fully priced and compared to long-term averages could even be regarded as expensive, whereas Europe and emerging markets offer some value. Many fundamental demographic and social changes are currently unfolding and the ability to apply a calm perspective, coupled with good stock picking, should generate strong alpha.

CORONATION GLOBAL EQUITY STRATEGY

	Launch date	1 year	3 years	5 years	Since inception
Fund	14 Nov 14	22.98%	-	-	5.02%
Benchmark		15.04%	-	-	4.90%

Annualised, quoted in USD

The fund returned 10.2% for the quarter, handsomely outperforming its benchmark return of 6.9%. As we have often argued in the past, this short-term performance is purely incidental, given the vagaries of financial markets over shorter periods of time. Our 12-month lagging return of 23% has been materially above the index return of 15%. However, the most pleasing aspect is that, on a gross basis, we have now moved into positive alpha territory since the inception of the strategy.

Given the challenging start shortly after launch, we worked hard at overcoming this deficit, and are pleased to report that this milestone has been achieved. Incidentally, our developed market carve-out has outperformed its benchmark by more than 3% per annum since inception (gross), again confirming that our philosophy and process are generating the required results.

The highlight of our portfolio returns over the last quarter was SoftBank's offer to acquire 100% of Fortress Investment Group (at the time a top five holding within the fund). The offer price represented a 60% premium to the undisturbed price, and while we think it still undervalues the stock by

between 20% and 30%, we recognised that the majority of the equity is held by management, who were supportive of the transaction and intended to stay on as part of the larger group. As such, even though we were a material minority shareholder, we could not influence the transaction outcome, and hence liquidated the position to invest the proceeds in other promising opportunities. Fortress contributed just over 2% alpha over the quarter, and just less than 2.5% over the last year. Since inception of the strategy, Fortress's contribution was a more modest 0.3%. We continue to believe that the alternative asset management sector offers interesting investment opportunities, and remain committed investors in stocks like Blackstone, Apollo, KKR & Co and Carlyle.

Other notable contributors to performance over the last year include Apollo, Estácio/Kroton (featured in previous commentaries), Amazon and Charter Communications. We had two material detractors in Limited Brands (discussed in more detail later) and TripAdvisor. In the case of TripAdvisor, we were again reminded about the importance of management and their ability to execute strategy that ultimately will be the largest determinant of success.

At the time of investing in TripAdvisor, we also invested in Priceline.com, the online travel agency that owns powerful platforms like Booking.com. While TripAdvisor and Priceline.com operate in the same sector and therefore benefit from the same strong secular drivers, Priceline.com's focus on driving simplicity and customer value has allowed it to significantly outperform TripAdvisor over the last few quarters, creating exceptional value for shareholders. TripAdvisor, on the other hand, has been trying to migrate its business model to include other services and changed value propositions for its customers, in the process losing focus and making some operational mistakes. We are watching them carefully to see if they can ultimately monetise the strong brand and content that they are known for.

As equity markets continued to scale new heights, we have become more concerned about valuation levels. It is clear that markets have been giving Trump the benefit of the doubt regarding his ability to reflate the economy and kickstart growth in the US, and ultimately across other regions of the world. We take a more sanguine approach in that we do not want to be paying for promises, especially coming from a volatile and inexperienced US administration. As such, we have bought some put options in the fund as protection (to a very limited extent) against exogenous shocks. These options, while cheap relative to history, still cost around 5% to 6% per annum for 'at the money' protection.

We also continued to look for value in the more defensively positioned sectors such as consumer staples (as covered in our December 2016 commentary). The world remains an uncertain place, and while we embrace taking risk when we believe the odds are tilted in our favour, we have become a little more circumspect in this regard.





Investment case for Limited Brands

Limited Brands is the owner of powerful brands like Victoria's Secret and Bath & Body Works. When we initially bought the stock, the investment thesis focused on a continued opportunity for growth in the US for Bath & Body Works and what we regarded as an outsized opportunity for Victoria's Secret in China. Since then, the competitive landscape (for Victoria's Secret) has intensified in the US, and coupled with continued pressure on footfall in conventional retail malls, investors have essentially given up on the company in terms of its ability to compete in its home market.

While short-term profits have been rebased downwards, we continued to add to our position, such that Limited Brands is now a top five position in the fund. We regard the brands as very powerful and relevant for future consumers, and still believe in the longer-term opportunity in China.

In the meantime, we are comfortable paying a price earnings multiple of 14 to 15 for the reduced profit base with continued strong cash generation. We expect our patience to be handsomely rewarded at some point in the future.

CORONATION GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY STRATEGY

	Launch date	1 year	3 years	5 years	Since inception	
Fund	14 Jul 08	19.20%	(1.48%)	3.97%	6.37%	
Benchmark		17.22%	1.38%	1.07%	1.70%	

Annualised, quoted in USD

The strategy returned 10.2% for the quarter, which was 1.2% behind the index's return of 11.4%. The biggest positive contributors over the period were JD.com (+22.2%, 0.45% contribution), Yes Bank (+39.6%, 0.37% contribution) and Naspers (+17.2%, 0.3% contribution). Three stocks detracted by 0.5% or more: Magnit (which declined by 13% and detracted by 0.9%), Kroton (which appreciated by 2%, but as this was well below the index return, it resulted in a -0.5% attribution) and not owning Samsung Electronics (which detracted by 0.5%). The strategy is now approaching its nine-year track record and over this period has outperformed the market by 4.6% per annum. Over the past seven- and five-year periods, the fund has outperformed the market by 3.2% per annum and 2.9% per annum respectively.

In terms of portfolio activity over the quarter, we added one new position (a 1% holding in Norilsk Nickel) and sold out of five smaller positions (all less than 1%). We sold out of Richemont, Arcos Dorados and NetEase on the basis that all three reached our estimate of fair value for the respective stocks, with both Arcos Dorados and NetEase having appreciated by more than 100% over the past year.

Sohu.com was sold as a result of our increasing concern about the long-term prospects for the video business, where it competes against three formidable players (Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent). Lastly, while still undervalued in our view, we sold out of Pão de Açúcar as a result of a reduced margin of safety due to a reduction in our fair value, given slower long-term top-line growth and lower long-term normal margins. Other selling activity of note includes our halving of the fund's position in Brilliance China (from 3% to 1.5% of fund) as the share moved closer to our fair value, having appreciated by 64% over the past year.

MMC Norilsk Nickel, the strategy's new holding, is the number one nickel producer in the world (35% of revenue), the number one palladium producer in the world (palladium/platinum make up just over 30% of revenue) and a top 10 global copper producer (25% of revenue). In our view, Norilsk's ore body in Siberia is one of the best geological assets in the world. Norilsk's nickel grades are, for example, 40% higher than the industry average, its copper grades 25% higher and its palladium/platinum grades above the SA platinum miners' average. This means that the revenue per ounce that Norilsk generates is far higher than that of most peers. As a result, margins are industry leading (EBITDA margins have averaged 50% over the past 10 years), as is the company's free cash flow generation (Norilsk has converted 100% of earnings into free cash flow over the past 10 years).

Norilsk trades on 10 times this year's earnings with a 9% dividend yield. In addition, the prices of all three of its core commodities (nickel, palladium and copper) are currently trading below normal (marginal cost of production) levels and earnings are therefore below normal in our view. We have valued Norilsk on a low-multiple/high-discount rate to take into account the risks (a cyclical asset, based in Russia). This valuation still gives substantial upside, making the share attractive on a risk-adjusted expected return basis, in our view

In terms of other buying activity during the quarter, we added to the strategy's Naspers position (the largest position, now 7.7% of strategy). Naspers's core asset is its 33% stake in Tencent (the leading gaming/social network internet company in China) and today Naspers trades at a 15% discount to the market value of this Tencent stake. In addition, Naspers owns considerable other assets.

The two most notable assets include its online classified businesses in numerous emerging markets and its pay TV assets in SA and 40 other African countries. In our view, Tencent is a great asset that we would happily own. Naspers, however, effectively enables us to buy Tencent at a discount to the latter's current market value, plus we get assets such as the online classified ads and pay TV for free. In addition, we have high regard for Naspers's management team and believe that over time they will create value in the assets excluding Tencent. The upside to our fair value for Naspers





is around 70%, making it extremely attractive in our view. At the end of the quarter, the fund had 5.5% combined exposure to the Indian financial services sector spread across the two private sector banks, Axis Bank and Yes Bank, as well as the country's leading mortgage provider, the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC). We have written before about why we like the private sector financials - in short, they are taking market share from their public sector counterparts in a market that is growing strongly due to low financial services penetration. We had been reducing the fund's exposure to each of the names during the course of 2016 as their share prices appreciated and their associated margin of safety (to our fair value) declined. In November 2016, the Indian government announced an immediate end to the acceptance of all existing Rs500 and Rs1 000 notes as legal tender. The outstanding notes had to be deposited by year-end or expire worthless. This process was aimed at catching tax evaders and bringing more of the economy into the formal market, partly in preparation for a national sales tax planned for introduction in April 2017, but also because so much money had left the banking system after gold import restrictions were introduced as a foreign currency saving measure during the mini-crisis of 2013. Since these notes represented approximately 98% of monetary value outstanding, and there was no transition period, the disruption to the economy was immense.

The effect was compounded by insufficient availability of the new replacement notes, and with India being a predominantly cash economy there was a big crunch on consumer spending in the final quarter of last year. The combined effect of this hit sentiment toward the banking sector and most of the listed bank shares fell. We saw this as a buying opportunity – given that the long-term impact on the banking sector (and hence the long-term fair values of the individual banks) is limited – and increased the strategy's positions accordingly.

Our view has largely been borne out by subsequent developments this year. In our recent interactions with the management teams of all three businesses it became apparent that their franchises have actually been enhanced by the demonetisation events, despite the short-term pressure on the economy and hence lending demand. In the case of Axis and Yes Bank, the investment in building out retail branch infrastructure (and their ATM networks) in recent years has paid dividends sooner than would otherwise have been the case. Both saw a significant inflow of deposits, which is a lower-cost source of funding, allowing them to increase their current and savings accounts ratio (as a percentage of total liabilities) at a faster rate than they have been able to historically. This is positive for long-term net interest margins and, if maintained, should result in strong profit growth once lending volumes normalise.

The private sector banks are also better placed to respond to the pick-up in lending demand as their lending books have been less affected by the slowdown of the fourth quarter of 2016. For HDFC, the inability of all industry lenders to accept cash for mortgage payments has hurt the competition only because HDFC has not historically accepted cash.

Other developments in the housing finance industry underpin HDFC's long-term prospects – in particular, the expansion of tax incentives for low-income housing, the easing of regulations related to raising of funding as well as better and more uniform regulation of housing developers themselves.

The weighted average upside to the portfolio at the end of March was just above 50%, which is in line with the long-term average. We continue to come across a number of potential new buys and the bigger challenge is deciding which positions to reduce or sell to make room for these potential new holdings. During the first quarter of 2017, we went on two research trips to Brazil as well as trips to India and Hong Kong. In the coming months, members of the team will be going to China, Russia, Indonesia and Singapore.

CORONATION GLOBAL MANAGED STRATEGY

	Launch date	1 year	3 years	5 years	Since inception	
Fund	1 Nov 09	13.48%	4.42%	8.40%	8.92%	
Benchmark		8.03%	3.31%	5.82%	6.49%	

Annualised, quoted in USD

The strategy returned 6.6% over the three-month period, handsomely outperforming its benchmark return of 4.8%. Our 12-month lagging return of 13.5% has been materially above the benchmark return of 8%. In fact, we are now ahead of the benchmark over all meaningful periods, and the strategy's annualised outperformance since inception stands at a pleasing 2.15% per annum. This number puts the fund comfortably in the top quintile of global funds with a similar mandate.

In the bond and equity markets, returns appear to have largely followed a pattern commensurate with asset risk. Therefore, the lower the credit rating, the better the return. This was illustrated by the fact that despite the US Federal Reserve (Fed) hiking interest rates in March, emerging market debt (in local currency) performed very strongly, producing a total return of 6.4%.

Additionally, returns were further boosted by the strength in emerging market currencies, with the Mexican peso, Russian rouble and Korean won rising between 8% and 10% against the US dollar over the quarter. Interestingly, despite a more hawkish Fed, US Treasury yields moved lower over the quarter, albeit only marginally. In the currency market, the clear trend during the quarter was that investors' long-standing preference for the US dollar has declined, with the



greenback underperforming every other major currency during the period. Global bonds returned 1.8% in US dollar terms over the quarter, but their 12-month lagging return remains a negative 1.9% due to the significant correction following the outcome of the US election in the fourth quarter of 2016.

Global listed property recovered somewhat after the postelection sell-off, although the asset class lagged equities by a significant margin. For the quarter, listed property returned 2.3%, marginally ahead of bonds. The asset class also performed slightly better than bonds over the last 12 months (up 1.9%), but much worse than equities (up 15%). Over three and five years, however, the returns from property and equities are very similar.

A very satisfying feature of the past quarter's performance is that we have outperformed all the relevant benchmarks in the fund's respective asset class buckets. In hindsight, the fund's exposure to equities could have been higher, but within the asset class we comfortably outperformed the benchmark over both the quarter and the year. Our property holdings did well over the quarter, even though the 12-month numbers remain negative.

Credit performed well over both the quarter and the year, and our gold holdings added significant alpha to the fund over the last quarter. Over the longer term, similar comments can be made about our stock/instrument selection within equity and credit, while the property holdings performed well relative to bonds.

The only negative over the quarter came from a poor return in the merger arbitrage bucket, which was impacted by continued uncertainty around the Rite Aid deal. We are monitoring the developments closely, but remain convinced that the potential returns outweigh the risks, and have added to this position.

The highlight of our equity returns over the last quarter was SoftBank's offer to acquire 100% of Fortress Investment Group (at the time a top five equity holding within the fund). For more detail on this, and other notable contributors to equity performance, please refer to the Global Equity Strategy commentary.

We have started adding some exposure to US property stocks for the first time in a while. These stocks sold off significantly following the correction in long bond rates, and most of the retail real estate investment trusts (REITs) were punished during this quarter as investor concerns focused on the potential 'death' of the US mall. While we concur that the internet will continue to gain market share at the expense of bricks-and-mortar retailers, our view differs from that of the market. In our opinion, the listed portfolios of US retail REITs comprise top-quality malls that should remain relevant to their tenants even in a more challenged world.

CORONATION AFRICA FRONTIERS

	Launch date	1 year	3 years	5 years	Since inception	
Fund	1 Oct 08	0.60%	(7.91%)	4.44%	7.76%	
Benchmark		0.87%	0.51%	0.43%	0.52%	

Annualised, quoted in USD

The fund returned 5.6% for the quarter, outperforming both its benchmark (3 Month USD Libor +5%), which was up 1.5%, and the JSE All Africa ex-SA 30 Index (up 0.61%). Performance was driven largely by Egypt (up 5.1%), while Kenya was virtually flat (+0.4%). Markets in Nigeria and Zimbabwe were down 4.7% and 3.9%, respectively.

Africa has been incredibly tough for investors over the past few years: for the period 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016, the MSCI Africa ex-SA Index lost 31% of its value. Africa-only funds did not make it through this torrid time unscathed. Based on a review of the industry, we believe assets under management have halved in the past two years, with a number of funds closing and only a dozen or so left with less than US\$10 million per fund to manage. Together with performance deterioration and significant outflows, previously liquid markets such as Egypt and Nigeria dried up to around a tenth of the average daily trade seen at their peak.

It is during times such as these that one's commitment to investing through the cycle is truly tested. But history has shown that this is also when long-term, valuation-driven investors find particularly attractive opportunities to buy stakes in high-quality businesses.

One such opportunity has been Egypt. Our country exposure at any one point in time is always a function of stock-specific attractiveness rather than a broad country overlay or target country exposure. However, we are particularly excited about the investment opportunities we are seeing on the Egyptian exchange. In previous commentaries we have discussed the devaluation of the Egyptian currency and its benefits at length. Since the devaluation, the Egyptian market performed very well, with the EGX100 up 22% to date. Egypt continued to benefit from increased investor interest during the quarter as foreign holdings of Egyptian government debt rose to around US\$4 billion (versus US\$300 million prior to the devaluation), and net equity purchases by foreigners total around US\$700 million since the devaluation.

Egypt has been the largest position in the fund since September 2015, as a number of assets traded at very attractive valuations on the back of several years of headwinds in the form of political and social unrest, the collapse of tourism, concerns around terrorism and more recently, the currency and foreign exchange crisis. Despite the strong share price performance witnessed since the





devaluation, we remain excited about a number of companies in Egypt: it is still early in the adjustment process put into motion in 2016, and while the operating environment has improved in terms of foreign exchange availability, company earnings are still well below our assessment of normal and businesses are still trading at very attractive multiples. In the short term, the positive policy decisions made by the government will no doubt continue to put pressure on consumers in the form of high inflation, coupled with lagged wage increases. However, in the medium term, we believe these policies will positively impact the economy and allow for growth, job creation, increased per capita income and improved welfare. Our preferred positions in Egypt are Eastern Tobacco, Egyptian International Pharmaceutical Industries Company and Commercial International Bank. We believe these companies have the ability to weather the short-term consumer pressure, benefit from the currency devaluation and, most importantly, have the ability to compound earnings over the long term.

Nigeria

Nigeria, on the other hand, continues to face significant issues, particularly with regard to its currency regime. Businesses are still finding it incredibly difficult to source foreign exchange. While the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) did remove the exchange rate peg in June 2016, allowing the currency to devalue to a level that is now roughly 60% above the pegged rate, equity prices have not responded as was the case in Egypt. As a result, many high-quality businesses now trade at values significantly below our estimate of fair value. However, due to the current foreign exchange shortages, we have low conviction on what the currency will do in the medium term and remain cautious in managing our exposure to this market. We prefer to hold companies that are better positioned to weather a devaluation and better able to navigate the constrained consumer environment.

There were some positive developments in Nigeria over the quarter: data released for the fourth quarter of 2016 indicated that the current account is once again in surplus on the back of an increase in production numbers and a stronger oil price. Nigeria was the only major oil economy that went from running a large trade surplus to a deficit during 2015 and 2016 due to output stoppages. Furthermore, on 24 March, the CBN confirmed that gross foreign exchange reserves increased to US\$30 billion, compared to lows of US\$24 billion in October 2016.

Another noteworthy development in recent weeks has been the narrowing of the spread between the parallel market and the official exchange rate due to the CBN pumping dollars into the system. The sustainability of this is of course questionable, and we continue to believe that what Nigeria needs is a transparent, flexible and functioning exchange rate regime that will allow companies to do business and restore investor confidence.

There are often days where the newsflow out of Africa paints a picture of impossible operating conditions, an unfavourable political environment, a constrained growth outlook and crippling government deficits, both internal and external. But we regularly make the point that financial markets typically turn when investors least expect them to and that when they do turn, they often do so very quickly. The fund has had a strong start to the year; however, we are mindful that there is still a long way to go and our commitment to clients remains intact: while staying mindful of potential volatility and risks, we will continue to diligently and rigorously analyse businesses from the bottom up and seek out exciting, long-term investment opportunities that are trading at attractive prices below what we believe to be their intrinsic value. It is this commitment to a process that has worked very well for Coronation over the past 24 years (across geographies and sectors, and through cycles) that we believe has the potential to generate above-average returns for our clients over meaningful periods of time.

CORONATION GLOBAL FRONTIERS

	Launch date	1 year	3 years	5 years	Since inception
Fund	1 Dec 14	10.72%	-	-	(1.48%)
Benchmark		0.87%	-	-	0.59%

Annualised, quoted in USD

The fund returned 5.4% for the quarter compared to its benchmark (3 Month USD Libor +3.5%), which was up 1.1%. The MSCI Frontier Markets Index returned 9.1% over this period with its two largest constituents, Kuwait (19% of the index) and Argentina (16% of the index) up 12% and 33%, respectively. The Argentinian performance was driven by a combination of green shoots in the economy and the potential for inclusion in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. We do not benchmark the fund against the index, a feature we consider to be a defining characteristic of the fund (as articulated in the October 2016 issue of *Corospondent*).

Other markets that performed strongly during the quarter include Vietnam (+8.4%), Bangladesh (+3.8%) and Jordan (+4.1%). Pakistan, which will be reclassified as an emerging market by the MSCI on 31 May 2017, was flat (+0.4%) and Sri Lanka was down 7.4%. In sub-Saharan Africa our largest country exposure, Egypt, was up 5.1% over the quarter. Following the devaluation of its currency in November 2016, the Egyptian market has performed very well, with the EGX100 up 22%.

The resulting improved foreign exchange availability, coupled with a number of positive policy moves by the government, has seen Egypt continuing to benefit from increased investor interest during this quarter: foreign holdings of government debt rose to around US\$4 billion versus US\$300 million before the devaluation, net equity



purchases by foreigners totalled around US\$700 million since the devaluation and the average daily value traded doubled in US dollar terms. Kenya was virtually flat (+0.4%) as the bulk of the sell-off witnessed in January was made up by gains in the larger companies on the exchange such as Safaricom. Markets in Nigeria and Zimbabwe were down 4.7% and 3.9%, respectively.

Two significant contributors to performance this quarter came from Bangladesh: Beximco Pharmaceuticals and BRAC Bank. BRAC Bank, which owns a stake in the largest mobile money player in the country, was up 33% over the quarter. It is currently the fund's biggest position as we are particularly excited about the opportunity for mobile money in Bangladesh. With less than a third of the adult population in Bangladesh having access to bank accounts and around eight in every 10 people living in rural areas, mobile money has enormous potential to meet the basic financial needs of a large number of people.

In the last seven years, we have closely followed M-Pesa, the Kenyan mobile money success story, and our learnings have been extremely useful in helping us understand the potential of bKash in Bangladesh. Compared to M-Pesa, we believe bKash is still in its infancy in terms of number of customers, range of products and profitability. bKash was started in 2011 and today has 80% market share, processing around four million transactions per day for its 30 million customers.

We believe that BRAC Bank presents an attractive investment opportunity too. Founded in 2001 with the explicit mandate to serve small and medium-sized enterprises and the unbanked population, BRAC Bank has the footprint and foundations in place to take advantage of Bangladesh's strong real GDP growth, significant foreign direct investment, improved political stability and security conditions, and robust domestic demand. A new CEO – known in the industry as quite the changemaker – has had a material influence on the strategy, processes, human capital and financial performance of the business over the past 12 months and we are confident that these changes will allow the bank to continue compounding earnings well into the future and delivering value to its shareholders.

We have strong conviction that our portfolio is filled with exciting investment ideas like BRAC Bank, Beximco Pharmaceuticals and Eastern Tobacco. The fund has had a strong start to the year; however, we are mindful that there is still a long way to go and our commitment to our clients remains intact: while staying mindful of potential volatility and risks, we will continue to diligently and rigorously analyse businesses from the bottom up and find exciting, long-term investment opportunities trading at attractive prices below what we believe to be their intrinsic value. It is this commitment to a process that has worked very well for Coronation over the past 24 years (across geographies and sectors, and through cycles). We believe it has the

potential to generate above-average returns for our clients over meaningful periods of time.

CORONATION GLOBAL BOND

	Launch date	1 year	3 years	5 years	Since inception
Fund	1 Oct 09	4.24%	1.08%	1.84%	3.23%
Benchmark		(1.90%)	(0.87%)	(0.39%)	0.91%

Annualised, quoted in USD

Global bond markets were relatively stable during the quarter following the large sell-off in the final months of 2016. Riskier asset classes continued to benefit from the broad upturn in global activity indicators, which saw corporate and emerging market bonds perform strongly. The perception that new US policy initiatives (such as infrastructure spending) may take longer than initially hoped saw the US dollar relinquish some of its strong gains. The currency ended up underperforming all the G10 currencies during the quarter. The fund had a strong quarter, up 3.21%, compared to the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index return of 1.76% for the same period.

After several months, the market still has more questions than answers about the Trump administration. However, one thing is clear: factions within the Republican Party mean policy implementation is not a given. The failure to repeal Obamacare will shift the focus back to fiscal and trade policies, but the chances of sweeping reform appear to be fading.

Meanwhile, economic data suggest the US economy remains healthy, but a significant divergence exists between hard data (retail sales, capital spending) – which are less robust – and soft data (consumer sentiment and business expectations). In fact, the GDP forecasting model of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta now estimates US growth to be below 1% in the first quarter (roughly 0.5% below market expectations).

Continued tightening in the labour market and evidence of rising wages were, however, sufficient for the Fed to raise the Fed funds rate by 0.25% in mid-March. More hawkish comments by Fed members in the run-up to the meeting led some to expect that the 'dots' would be revised higher. In the end, only the 2019 expectations were revised upwards by 0.125% to 3%.

The market now prices a 50% chance of a further 0.25% hike in June and one and a half moves by year-end. The central projections by Fed officials remain considerably above those projected by the market beyond 2017. However, it is worth remembering that Fed policy can be reshaped considerably given that three vacancies on the board of governors will be coming due during 2017, as well as the chair (Janet Yellen)







and potentially the vice chair (Stanley Fischer) in 2018. After eight years, during which core personal consumption expenditures inflation has been below target for all of but four months, senior Fed economists recently published a paper reminding markets that the Federal Open Market Committee inflation goal is symmetrical (around 2%). The paper concluded that policy should allow for higher inflation than target during normal times. Clearly, this would have important implications for the setting of interest rates and how people perceive the merits of US inflation-linked bonds if voiced more openly by voting Fed members.

US 10-year yields ended the quarter at the low end of a relatively tight range (2.4% to 2.6%), with the curve flattening very slightly. Breakeven rates of inflation were also very stable around 2% with the correlation of longer breakevens and the oil price falling to almost nothing. On 15 March, the suspension of the previous debt ceiling (agreed to in October 2015) lapsed. For now, the Treasury has a few tricks up its sleeve to postpone the date on which it runs out of cash, but at some point in the next few months a further suspension will have to be agreed on by Congress, raising the prospect of a further political logjam. The latest long-term budgetary outlook (released by the Congressional Budget Office) projects US debt to rise from 77% of GDP to 150% of GDP over the next 30 years should nothing change. The debt ceiling debate also highlights the challenges of pushing through large infrastructure spending.

Subsequent to the changes to US money market regulation in October 2016, there has been increased demand for short-dated assets. The recently reduced issuance of US Treasury bills (as a result of the debt ceiling) has seen short-dated instruments trade at expensive levels, with swap spreads widening significantly at the short end. The richness of short-dated government bonds also lent demand to shorter-dated AAA-rated instruments, which tightened by between 10 basis points (bps) and 15 bps during the quarter. The fund increased its exposure to the US over the three-month period via the two-year and 10-year portion of the curve, while reducing its exposure to the long end.

Within Europe, both economic activity and inflation expectations have improved. The European Central Bank's (ECB) March policy meeting came shortly after the release of February's inflation data, which showed that inflation touched 2%.

The ECB's updated growth and inflation forecasts were both revised marginally higher in what was taken to be a hawkish signal by the market and the one-year forward rate one year from now jumped 0.2% as the prospect of rate rises in 2018 began to be discussed (as has the timing of scaling back quantitative easing). Since then, March's inflation forecast has been released, showing inflation back at 1.5% and it appears the ECB is seeking to calm the market. Having been wrong-footed by the outcome of the Brexit vote and

US elections, the French elections remain a key focus for the market. Marine Le Pen's chances appear slim, but until there is clarity, short-dated German bonds will continue to attract a safe-haven premium. French debt performed the worst during the quarter, while other peripheral debt (such as Italy) also struggled as problems in the banking system continue to cast a shadow. With the real yield on German 10-year bonds trading below -1% we see little reason to hold European government bonds.

Emerging market debt performed strongly during the quarter, both in hard currency terms (with the Emerging Market Bond Index [EMBI] spread narrowing from 3.65% to 3.28%) and in local currency terms (as local debt markets witnessed significant inflows). The fund added to its holdings in Mexico, which subsequently performed well (as bond yields tightened by 50 bps compared to US Treasuries) and the peso appreciated strongly against the US dollar (as Trump's anti-Mexico rhetoric moderated). The fund has since scaled back some of its exposure to the peso. In January, we sold our hard currency denominated Turkish bonds in favour of local currency bonds after further weakness in the lira.

SA was among the best performing markets until mid-March when political risks once again emerged, sending bond yields 70 bps higher and the currency gave back the 10% it had gained. The fund had reduced some of its SA bond and currency exposure prior to the weakness. In frontier markets, the fund invested in Egyptian treasury bills (where interest rates and the currency are viewed as undervalued) and in Argentinian short-dated US dollar-denominated bonds.

Corporate bonds (particularly those in the US) performed strongly during the quarter and were reflective of the positive sentiment in equity markets. Despite high levels of issuance, new deals have been well supported with very little new issuance premium. Lower-rated entities performed best, but a weaker oil price and outflows from high-yield funds have begun to see a more cautious tone emerge in the high-yield space. All of Trump's envisioned tax policies (whether a border adjustment tax, lower corporate tax rates or tax breaks on repatriated earnings) have important sectoral influences that the market will have to grapple with. Within Europe, the timing of any further reduction in asset purchases will be a key factor for the market. We remain cautious on valuations at current levels. The fund added some exposure in the form of Cromwell convertible bonds and tendered its holding in Old Mutual Tier 1 securities.

After strengthening in the wake of the US elections, the US dollar fell victim to extended expectations and weakened across all G10 currencies as well as a wide range of emerging market currencies. The currency's weakness can be attributed to the following factors: Firstly, the fact that Trump has not revealed greater detail about his plans for tax reform and infrastructure spending, prompting fears that the fiscal boost to the economy will be less than anticipated, disappointed



investors to some extent. Secondly, economic activity in other regions surprised on the upside. The euro also derived support from a reduction in short speculative positions as the market reacted to the prospect of tighter monetary policy within Europe.

Having been the weakest G10 currency since the US election, the yen was one of the best performing (up 4.5% versus the US dollar) over the quarter as the reflation trade unwound. The yen also benefited from a reduction in flows from Japanese investors into the international markets ahead of the Japanese year-end. The fund remains slightly overweight US dollars, but has been reducing its underweight in euros and yen, which we believe continue to be undervalued in

fundamentals. The fund's other key currency holdings are in Mexico, Turkey and Egypt.

The fund remains underweight duration, but has reduced this underweight by adding to its US exposure. The fund is also overweight a number of emerging markets where we believe currencies remain cheap. Our exposure to corporate bonds is relatively modest and we remain cautious given current valuations. There seems to be a sense in markets that we are entering a new reflationary phase and central banks will be able to unwind the exceptionally accommodative polices that have been in place for many years. Whether this proves to be the case is the key to holding markets that will ultimately perform.





INSTITUTIONAL FUND PERFORMANCE

		LAUNCH							ANN SINCE
PORTFOLIOS ^A	FEESº	DATE	1YEAR	3 YEARS	5 YEARS	10 YEARS	15 YEARS	LAUNCH†	LAUNCH †
GLOBAL BALANCED									
Global Houseview	G	Oct-93	5.68%	8.58%	14.39%	12.24%	15.71%	3 551.40%	16.54%
Median of the Peer Group*			4.96%	8.10%	12.85%	10.14%	14.24%	2 657.97%	15.16%
Alpha			0.72%	0.48%	1.54%	2.10%	1.47%	893.43%	1.38%
Managed	G	May-96	8.50%	8.57%	14.95%	13.03%		2 565.70%	16.99%
Median of the Peer Group*			4.96%	8.10%	12.85%			1 452.59%	14.01%
Alpha DOMESTIC BALANCED			3.54%	0.47%	2.10%	2.89%	1.98%	1 113.11%	2.98%
Domestic Houseview	G	Jan-98	5.66%	7.12%	12.30%	11.62%	16.69%	1 679.02%	16.13%
Domestic Balanced Benchmark	G	Jan-36	4.51%	7.12%	11.17%	9.87%	13.47%	1 079.02%	13.43%
Alpha			1.14%	(0.11%)	1.13%	1.76%	3.22%	648.11%	2.70%
SPECIALIST EQUITY			1.14%	(0.11%)	1.15%	1.70%	3.22%	040.11%	2.70%
Houseview Equity	G	Oct-93	4.89%	5.70%	14.37%	12.51%	18.16%	4 481.62%	17.67%
Houseview Equity Benchmark	Ü	00000	2.70%	6.33%	12.74%	10.29%	14.85%	2 469.53%	14.81%
Alpha			2.20%	(0.63%)	1.63%	2.22%	3.31%	2 012.09%	2.86%
Aggressive Equity	G	Jan-04	9.71%	4.55%	12.77%	12.46%	18.31%	1 162.95%	18.20%
Aggressive Equity Benchmark			2.70%	6.33%	12.74%	10.29%	14.85%	764.85%	15.29%
Alpha			7.02%	(1.78%)	0.04%	2.17%	3.46%	398.10%	2.91%
Core Equity	G	Mar-04	3.89%	6.00%	14.10%	12.84%		895.78%	19.20%
FTSE/JSE Shareholder Weighted Index			1.59%	7.08%	13.27%	10.61%	_	686.99%	17.08%
Alpha			2.30%	(1.08%)	0.82%	2.23%	-	208.79%	2.12%
SPECIALIST FIXED INTEREST									
Strategic Cash	G	Sep-06	8.50%	7.77%	7.16%	8.15%	-	129.59%	8.17%
Short Term Fixed Interest 3 Month Index			7.20%	6.43%	5.91%	7.04%	-	106.97%	7.12%
Alpha			1.30%	1.35%	1.25%	1.11%	-	22.62%	1.05%
Active Bond	G	Jul-00	12.40%	8.35%	8.67%	9.19%	11.08%	528.95%	11.60%
BEASSA All Bond Index			11.02%	7.45%	7.38%	8.06%	10.15%	446.60%	10.67%
Alpha			1.38%	0.89%	1.29%	1.13%	0.93%	82.34%	0.93%
Strategic Bond	G	Jan-08	12.21%	8.61%	8.96%	-	-	141.91%	10.02%
BEASSA All Bond Index			11.02%	7.45%	7.38%	-	-	111.72%	8.45%
Alpha			1.19%	1.16%	1.59%	-	-	30.19%	1.57%
Absolute Bond	G	Mar-03	9.26%	7.98%	8.11%	10.43%	-	306.32%	10.47%
CPI			6.35%	5.55%	5.73%	6.37%	-	121.85%	5.82%
Alpha			2.91%	2.43%	2.38%	4.06%	-	184.47%	4.65%
Flexible Fixed Income	G	Jul-10	11.64%	9.04%	9.39%	-	-	92.10%	10.15%
BEASSA All Bond Index			11.02%	7.45%	7.38%	-	-	73.09%	8.47%
Alpha			0.62%	1.59%	2.01%	-	-	19.01%	1.69%
Short Term Fixed Interest 3 Month Index			7.20%	6.43%	5.91%	-	-	46.85%	5.86%
Alpha			4.44%	2.61%	3.48%	-	-	45.24%	4.30%
Medical Aid Cash	G	Dec-05	8.73%	7.73%	7.01%	8.09%	-	140.37%	8.05%
Short Term Fixed Interest 3 Month Index			7.20%	6.43%	5.91%	7.04%	-	117.85%	7.11%
Alpha			1.53%	1.31%	1.10%	1.05%	-	22.52%	0.93%
INFLATION-LINKED BENCHMARK									
Global Absolute	G	Aug-99	7.43%	7.90%	11.82%	11.12%	15.40%	1 292.53%	16.08%
CPI			6.35%	5.55%	5.73%	6.37%	5.98%	191.58%	6.24%
Alpha			1.08%	2.35%	6.10%	4.75%	9.41%	1 100.95%	9.83%
Domestic Absolute	G	Apr-02	7.71%	6.39%	9.02%	10.14%	15.40%	756.80%	15.40%
СРІ			6.35%	5.55%	5.73%	6.37%	5.98%	139.08%	5.98%
Alpha			1.36%	0.84%	3.29%	3.77%	9.41%	617.72%	9.41%
Inflation Plus	G	Oct-09	7.94%	8.32%	10.10%		-	120.86%	11.14%
СРІ			6.35%	5.55%	5.73%	-	-	48.73%	5.44%
Alpha			1.59%	2.76%	4.37%	-			5.71%
Medical Absolute	G	May-04	7.19%	6.37%	8.71%			401.52%	13.30%
СРІ			6.35%	5.55%	5.73%			109.67%	5.90%
Alpha			0.84%	0.81%	2.99%	3.49%	-	291.86%	7.40%



PORTFOLIOS ^A	FEES ^o	LAUNCH DATE	1YEAR	3 YEARS	5 YEARS	10 YEARS	15 YEARS	CUM SINCE LAUNCH †	ANN SINCE LAUNCH †
HEDGE FUNDS									
Coronation Presidio Hedge Fund	N	Oct-05	1.83%	7.51%	16.18%	15.56%	-	474.07%	16.41%
Cash			6.76%	6.04%	5.57%	6.67%	-	112.38%	6.77%
Alpha			(4.93%)	1.47%	10.60%	8.89%	-	361.69%	9.64%
Coronation Multi-Strategy Arbitrage Hedge Fund	N	Jul-03	22.21%	10.84%	10.56%	11.79%	-	428.49%	12.87%
Cash			6.76%	6.04%	5.57%	6.67%	-	151.17%	6.93%
Alpha			15.45%	4.80%	4.99%	5.11%	-	277.32%	5.94%
Coronation Granite Hedge Fund	N	Oct-02	9.64%	8.06%	7.81%	9.19%	-	304.14%	10.11%
Cash			6.76%	6.04%	5.57%	6.67%	-	174.71%	7.22%
Alpha			2.88%	2.02%	2.24%	2.52%	-	129.43%	2.89%
OFFSHORE FUNDS ¹									
Coronation Global Equity FoF (US\$)	N	Jul-00	17.18%	5.50%	10.50%	6.47%	9.02%	176.00%	6.25%
Coronation Global Equity FoFs Benchmark			15.04%	5.95%	9.89%	4.76%	6.79%	100.29%	4.23%
Alpha			2.14%	(0.45%)	0.61%	1.71%	2.24%	75.72%	2.01%
Coronation Global Managed (US\$)	G	Nov-09	13.48%	4.42%	8.40%	-	-	88.50%	8.92%
Coronation Global Managed Benchmark			8.03%	3.31%	5.82%	-	-	59.38%	6.49%
Alpha			5.46%	1.10%	2.59%	-	-	29.12%	2.44%
Global Capital Plus (US\$)	G	Sep-09	7.53%	2.70%	5.51%	-	-	57.49%	6.17%
Global Capital Plus Benchmark			0.87%	(2.93%)	(1.29%)	-	-	(7.46%)	(1.02%)
Alpha			6.66%	5.63%	6.80%	-	-	64.94%	7.19%
Global Bond (US\$)	G	Oct-09	4.24%	1.08%	1.84%	-	-	26.90%	3.23%
Global Bond Benchmark			(1.90%)	(0.87%)	(0.39%)	-	-	7.04%	0.91%
Alpha			6.14%	1.95%	2.23%	-	-	19.86%	2.32%
Global Emerging Markets Equity Strategy	G	Jul-08	19.20%	(1.48%)	3.97%	-	-	71.37%	6.37%
Coronation Global Emerging Markets Equity Benchmark			17.22%	1.38%	1.07%	-	-	15.88%	1.70%
Alpha			1.98%	(2.86%)	2.90%	-	-	55.50%	4.67%
Coronation All Africa Strategy	G	Aug-08	6.18%	(7.48%)	3.51%	-	-	76.92%	6.80%
3 Month USD Libor			0.87%	0.51%	0.43%	-	-	5.00%	0.57%
Alpha			5.31%	(7.99%)	3.07%	-	-	71.92%	6.24%
Coronation Africa Frontiers Strategy	G	Oct-08	0.60%	(7.91%)	4.44%	-	-	88.76%	7.76%
3 Month USD Libor			0.87%	0.51%	0.43%	-	-	4.48%	0.52%
Alpha			(0.27%)	(8.41%)	4.01%	-	-	84.28%	7.24%
Coronation Global Frontiers	G	Dec-14	10.72%	-	-	-	-	(3.41%)	(1.48%)
3 Month USD Libor			0.87%	-	-	-	-	1.38%	0.59%
Alpha			9.85%	-	-	-	-	(4.79%)	(2.06%)
Coronation Global Equity Strategy	G	Nov-14	22.98%	-	-	-	-	12.56%	5.02%
MSCI All Country World Net US\$			15.04%	-	-	-	-	12.26%	4.90%
Alpha			7.93%	-	-	-	-	0.30%	0.12%

¹ Figures quoted in US\$ as at 31 March 2017.

 $^{^\}Delta$ $\,$ Figures are quoted from the Independent Retirement Fund Survey as at 31 March 2017.

^{*} Median of the Peer Group is the median of the largest fund manager's fully-discretionary retirement fund portfolios as published in performance surveys and calculated by Coronation Fund Managers.

º G = Gross, N = Net

[†] CUM SINCE LAUNCH = Cumulative returns since launch, ANN SINCE LAUNCH = Annualised returns since launch. Figures of one year and less indicate percentage change.




LONG-TERM INVESTMENT TRACK RECORD



CORONATION HOUSEVIEW EQUITY RETURNS VS EQUITY BENCHMARK


5-YEAR ANNUALISED RETURNS	CORONATION HOUSEVIEW EQUITY	EQUITY BENCHMARK	ALPHA
1998	8.15%	6.49%	1.66%
1999	14.23%	10.91%	3.33%
2000	10.93%	7.52%	3.41%
2001	10.95%	9.38%	1.57%
2002	9.46%	7.80%	1.66%
2003	18.02%	13.78%	4.24%
2004	14.12%	9.63%	4.49%
2005	23.35%	18.94%	4.41%
2006	28.38%	23.66%	4.72%
2007	33.79%	29.55%	4.24%
2008	23.36%	19.73%	3.63%
2009	22.23%	20.67%	1.56%
2010	18.55%	15.73%	2.82%
2011	11.58%	8.73%	2.85%
2012	13.39%	10.10%	3.29%
2013	24.37%	20.21%	4.16%
2014	19.39%	16.08%	3.31%
2015	14.05%	13.14%	0.91%
2016	14.77%	13.33%	1.44%
4 years 3 months to 31 March 2017	12.38%	10.43%	1.95%
ANNUALISED TO 31 MARCH 2017			
1 year	4.89%	2.70%	2.20%
3 years	5.70%	6.33%	(0.63%)
5 years	14.37%	12.74%	1.63%
10 years	12.51%	10.29%	2.22%
Since inception in October 1993 annualised	17.67%	14.81%	2.86%
Average outperformance per 5-year return			2.98%
Number of 5-year periods outperformed			20.00

CUMULATIVE PERFORMANCE



An investment of R100 000 in Coronation Houseview Equity on 1 October 1993 would have grown to **R4 581 617** by 31 March 2017. By comparison, the returns generated by the Equity Benchmark over the same period would have grown a similar investment to **R2 569 528**.

ANNUALISED RETURNS TO 31 MARCH 2017





CORONATION GLOBAL HOUSEVIEW (BALANCED) RETURNS VS MEDIAN OF PEER GROUP*

5-YEAR ANNUALISED RETURNS	CORONATION GLOBAL HOUSEVIEW	MEDIAN OF PEER GROUP*	ALPHA
1998	11.21%	11.26%	(0.04%)
1999	16.36%	15.54%	0.82%
2000	13.82%	13.17%	0.65%
2001	16.54%	15.02%	1.52%
2002	12.74%	12.05%	0.69%
2003	17.67%	15.96%	1.71%
2004	14.35%	13.30%	1.05%
2005	19.58%	18.16%	1.42%
2006	20.74%	19.53%	1.22%
2007	24.93%	24.82%	0.10%
2008	18.96%	17.52%	1.44%
2009	18.28%	15.19%	3.09%
2010	15.23%	12.02%	3.21%
2011	10.75%	8.32%	2.43%
2012	12.23%	9.83%	2.40%
2013	20.13%	17.67%	2.46%
2014	17.52%	15.64%	1.88%
2015	15.69%	14.61%	1.08%
2016	14.65%	13.61%	1.04%
4 years 3 months to 31 March 2017	13.26%	12.85%	0.41%
ANNUALISED TO 31 MARCH 2017			
1 year	5.68%	4.96%	0.72%
3 years	8.58%	8.10%	0.48%
5 years	14.39%	12.85%	1.54%
10 years	12.24%	10.14%	2.10%
Since inception in October 1993 annualised	16.54%	15.16%	1.38%
Average outperformance per 5-year return			1.43%
Number of 5-year periods outperformed			19.00

CUMULATIVE PERFORMANCE

ANNUALISED RETURNS TO 31 MARCH 2017



An investment of R100 000 in Coronation Global Balanced on 1 October 1993 would have grown to R3 651 399 by 31 March 2017. By comparison, the Median return of Global Large Managers over the same period would have grown a similar investment to R2 717 991.

^{*} Median of Peer Group is the median of the fully-discretionary retirement portfolios of the largest managers as published in performance surveys and calculated by Coronation Fund Managers.





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